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Motivated by applications such as viral marketing, the problem of influence maximization (IM) has been extensively studied in the
literature. The goal is to select a small number of users to adopt an item such that it results in a large cascade of adoptions by others.
Existing works have three key limitations. (1) They do not account for economic considerations of a user in buying/adopting items.
(2) Most studies on multiple items focus on competition, with complementary items receiving limited attention. (3) For the network
owner, maximizing social welfare is important to ensure customer loyalty, which is not addressed in prior work in the IM literature. In
this paper, we address all three limitations and propose a novel model called UIC that combines utility-driven item adoption with
influence propagation over networks. Focusing on the mutually complementary setting, we formulate the problem of social welfare
maximization in this novel setting. We show that while the objective function is neither submodular nor supermodular, surprisingly a
simple greedy allocation algorithm achieves a factor of (1 − 1/e − ϵ ) of the optimum expected social welfare. We develop bundleGRD,
a scalable version of this approximation algorithm, and demonstrate, with comprehensive experiments on real and synthetic datasets,
that it significantly outperforms all baselines.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Motivated by applications such as viral marketing, the problem of influence maximization has been extensively studied
in the literature [34]. The seminal paper of Kempe et al. [30] formulated influence maximization (IM) as a discrete
optimization problem: given a directed graph G = (V ,E,p), with nodes V , edges E, a function p : E → [0, 1] associating
influence weights with edges, a stochastic diffusion modelM , and a seed budget k , select a set S ⊂ V of up to k seed
nodes such that by activating the nodes S , the expected number of nodes of G that get activated underM is maximized.
Two fundamental diffusion models are independent cascade (IC) and linear threshold (LT) [30]. Most of the work on
IM has focused on a single item or phenomenon propagating through the network, and has developed efficient and
scalable heuristic and approximation algorithms for IM [6, 17, 19, 51].
Subsequent work studies multiple campaigns propagating through a network [3, 8, 11, 24, 35, 36, 46], mostly focusing
on competing campaigns. One exception is the Com-ICmodel by Lu et al. [36], which studied the effect of complementary
products propagating through a network. A significant omission from the literature on IM and viral marketing is a
study with item adoptions grounded in a sound economic footing.
Adoption of items by users is a well-studied concept in economics [40, 45]: item adoption by a user is driven by the
utility that the user can derive from the item (or itemset). Precisely, a user’s utility for an item(set) is the difference
between the valuation that the user has for the item(set) and the price she pays. A rich body of literature in combinatorial
auctions (e.g., see [23, 29, 32]) studies the optimal allocation of goods to users, given the users’ valuation for various
sets of goods. These studies are not concerned with the influence propagation in networks, whereby users’ desire of
items arises due to the influence from their network neighbors who already adopted items, and then these users may in
turn adopt the items if they could obtain positive utility from them and start influencing their neighbors about these
items. Considering such network propagation is important for applications such as viral marketing [30].
This paper takes the first step to combine viral marketing (influence maximization) with a framework of item
adoption grounded in the economic principle of item utility. We propose a novel and powerful framework for capturing
the interaction between these two paradigms, and study the social welfare maximization in this context, i.e., maximize
the sum of utilities of itemsets adopted by users at the end of a campaign, in expectation. The utility of an itemset is
defined to be the valuation of the itemset minus the price of the itemset. Social welfare is well studied in combinatorial
auctions, but it has not been well studied in the context of network propagation and viral marketing.
In this paper, we focus on a setting where the items are mutually complementary, by modeling user valuation for
itemsets as a supermodular function (definition in §2). Supermodularity captures the intuition that between comple-
mentary items, the marginal value-gain of an item w.r.t. a set of items increases as the set grows. Many companies
offer complementary products, e.g., Apple offers iPhone, and AirPod. The marginal value-gain of AirPod is higher for a
user who has bought an iPhone, compared to a user who hasn’t. Complementary items have been well studied in the
economics literature and supermodular function is a typical way for modeling their valuations (e.g., see [9, 53]). As a
preview, our experiments show that complementary items are natural and that their valuation is indeed supermodular
(Section 4.3.4). We study adoptions of complementary items, by combining a basic stochastic diffusion model with the
utility model for item adoption.
In practice, prices of items may be known, but our knowledge of users’ valuation for items may be uncertain. Thus,
we further add a random noise to the utility function. We formulate the optimization problem of finding the optimal
allocation of items to seed nodes under item budget constraints so as to maximize the expected social welfare. The task
is NP-hard, but more challenging is our result that the expected social welfare is neither submodular nor supermodular
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under the reasonable assumption that price and noise are additive. We show that we can still design an efficient
algorithm that achieves a (1− 1/e − ϵ)-approximation to the optimal expected social welfare, for any small ϵ > 0. While
our main algorithm is still based on the greedy approach for solving submodular function maximization, its analysis is
far from trivial, because the objective function is neither submodular nor supermodular. As part of our proof strategy,
we develop a novel block accounting method for reasoning about expected social welfare for properly defined blocks of
items.
An important feature of our algorithm is that it does not require the valuations or prices of items as the input, and
merely the fact that item valuation is supermodular while price and noise are additive is sufficient to guarantee the
approximation ratio. This means that we do not need to obtain the valuations or marginal valuations of items, which
may not be straightforward to get in practice.
To summarize, in this paper, we study the problem of optimal allocation of items to seeds subject to item budgets,
such that after network propagation the expected social welfare is maximized, and we make the following contributions:
1. We incorporate utility-based item adoption with influence diffusion into a novel multi-item diffusion model,
Utility-driven IC (UIC) model. UIC can support any mix of competing and complementary items. In this paper, we study
the social welfare maximization problem for mutually complementary items (§3).
2. We propose a greedy allocation algorithm, and show that the algorithm achieves a (1−1/e−ϵ)-approximation ratio,
even though the social welfare function is neither submodular nor supermodular (§4.1 and §4.2). Our main technical
contribution is the block accounting method, which distributes social welfare to properly defined item blocks. The
analysis is highly nontrivial and may be of independent interest to other studies.
3. We design a prefix-preserving seed selection algorithm for multi-item IM that may be of independent interest, with
running time and memory usage in the same order as the scalable approximation algorithm IMM [51] on the maximum
budgeted item, regardless of the number of items (§4.2).
4. We conduct detailed experiments comparing the performance of our algorithm with baselines on five large
real networks, with both real and synthetic utility configurations. Our results show that our algorithm significantly
dominates the baselines in terms of running time or expected social welfare or both (§4.3).
2 BACKGROUND & RELATEDWORK
2.1 Single Item Influence Maximization
A social network is represented as a directed graph G = (V ,E,p) , V being the set of nodes (users), E the set of edges
(connections), with |V | = n and |E | = m. The function p : E → [0, 1] specifies influence probabilities (or weights)
between users. Two of the classic diffusion models are independent cascade (IC) and linear threshold (LT).
We briefly review the IC model. Given a set S ⊂ V of seeds, diffusion proceeds in discrete time steps. At t = 0, only
the seeds are active. At every time t > 0, each node u that became active at time t − 1 makes one attempt at activating
each of its inactive out-neighbors v , i.e., it tests if the edge (u,v) is “live” or “blocked”. The attempt succeeds (the edge
(u,v) is live) with probability puv := p(u,v). The diffusion stops when no more nodes become active.
We refer the reader to [15, 30] for details of these models and their generalizations. The influence spread of a seed set
S , denoted σ (S), is the expected number of active nodes after the diffusion that starts from the seed set S ends.
Influence maximization (IM) is the problem of finding, for a given number k and a diffusion model, a set S ⊂ V of k
seed nodes that generates the maximum influence spread σ (S) [30].
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Most existing studies on IM rely on the corresponding influence spread function σ (S) beingmonotone and submodular.
A set function f : 2U → R is monotone if f (S) ≤ f (T ) whenever S ⊆ T ⊆ U ; submodular if for any S ⊆ T ⊆ U and
any x ∈ U \T , f (S ∪ {x}) − f (S) ≥ f (T ∪ {x}) − f (T ); f is supermodular if the inequality above is reversed; and f is
modular if it is both submodular and supermodular. Under both the IC and LT models, the IM problem is NP-hard [30]
and computing σ (S) exactly for any S ⊆ V is #P-hard [17, 19]. Since σ (·) is monotone and submodular for both IC and
LT, a simple greedy seed selection algorithm together with Monte Carlo simulation for estimating the spread, achieves
an (1 − 1/e − ϵ)-approximation, for any ϵ > 0 [29, 30, 42]. While several heuristics for IM were proposed over the
years [17–19, 28, 31], they do not offer any guarantee on the influence spread achieved. Borgs et al. [6] proposed the
notion of random reverse reachable sets (rr-sets) for spread estimation as an alternative to using MC simulations and
paved the way for efficient approximation algorithms for IM. Tang et al. [51, 52] leveraged rr-sets to propose scalable
approximation algorithms for IM called TIM and IMM, which are orders of magnitude faster than the classic greedy
algorithm making use of MC simulations for estimating the spread [30]. Building on the notion of rr-sets, a family of
scalable approximation algorithms such as TIM, IMM, and SSA, have been developed for IM [26, 43, 51, 52].
Motivated by designing an influence oracle, that responds to queries to find seeds for any given budget, Cohen et
al. [20] proposed an IM algorithm called SKIM that leverages bottom-k sketches. A noteworthy property of SKIM is
that it produces an ordering of the nodes such that any prefix of the ordering consisting of k nodes is guaranteed to
have a spread that is at least (1 − 1/e − ϵ) times the optimal spread for a seed budget of k . Thus, SKIM is essentially a
prefix-preserving algorithm in context of single item IM. However, as shown in [20], SKIM does not dominate TIM
in performance. Given that IMM is orders of magnitude faster than TIM, there is a natural motivation to build a
prefix-preserving IM algorithm by adapting IMM to a multi-item context.
Influence maximization under non-submodular models has been studied in previous work [16, 33, 36, 48]. Most of
them show hardness of approximation results [16, 33, 48]. In terms of approximation algorithms, Chen et al. rely on a
low-rank assumption to provide an algorithm solving the non-submodular amphibious influence maximization problem
with an approximation ratio of (1 − 1/e − ϵ)3 [16]. Lu et al. use the sandwich approximation to give a problem instance
dependent approximation ratio [36]. Schoenebeck and Tao provide a dynamic programming algorithm for influence
maximization in the restricted one-way hierarchical blockmodel [48]. Li et al. provide an approximation algorithm
with approximation ratio (1 − ϵ)ℓ(1 − 1/e), in a network when at most ℓ nodes are ϵ-almost submodular and the rest of
the nodes are submodular [33]. In contrast, our algorithm in this paper achieves the (1 − 1/e − ϵ) approximation ratio
(same as the ratio for submodular maximization) for a non-submodular objective function, under a general network
without further assumptions.
2.2 Multi-item Influence Maximization
More recently, multiple items have been considered in the context of viral marketing of non-competing items [22, 41].
However their proposed solutions do not provide the typical (1 − 1/e − ϵ)-approximation guarantee. Specifically Datta
et al. [22] studied IM where propagations of items are assumed to be independent and provided a 1/3-approximate
algorithm. In [41], Narayanam et al. propose an extension of the LT model, where items are partitioned into two sets. A
product can be adopted by a node only when it has already adopted a corresponding product in the other set. Such
partition of itemsets, with strong dependencies on mutual adoptions of items in the two sets, represents a restricted
special case of item adoptions in the real world.
Competitive influencemaximization is studied in [3, 7, 8, 10, 14, 24, 35, 46] (see [15] for a survey), where a user adopts at
most one item from the set of items being propagated. Theworksmainly focus on the “follower’s perspective” [3, 8, 10, 24],
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i.e., given competitor’s seed placement, select seeds so as to maximize one’s own spread, or minimize the competitor’s
spread. Lu et al. [35] focused onmaximizing the total influence spread of all campaigners from a network host perspective,
while ensuring fair allocation.
Lu et al. [36] introduced a model called Com-IC capturing both competition and complementarity between a pair
of items, leveraging the notion of a node level automaton (NLA). An NLA is a stochastic decision-making automaton
governed by transition probabilities for a user adopting an item given what it has already adopted. Their model subsumes
perfect complementarity and pure competition as special cases. However, their main study is confined to the diffusion
of two items, and a straightforward extension to multiple items would need an exponential number of parameters in the
number of items. Moreover, their general parameter settings could lead to anomalies such as one item complementing a
second item but the second one competing with the first one, or being indifferent to it.
All of the above works on multiple item propagations focus on maximizing the expected number of item adoptions,
which is not aligned with social welfare.
Myers and Leskovec analyzed the effects of different cascades on users and predicted the likelihood that a user
will adopt an item, seeing the cascades in which the user participated [39]. McAuley et al.[37] proposed a method to
learn complementary relationships between products from user reviews. None of the works models the diffusion of
complementary items, nor study the IM problem in this context.
2.3 Combinatorial Auctions
Combinatorial auctions are widely studied and a survey is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we discuss a few
key papers. In economics, adoption of items by users is modeled in terms of the utility that the user derives from the
adoption [25, 40, 45, 47]. A classic problem is givenm users and n items and the utility function of users for various
subsets of items, find an allocation of items to users such that the social welfare, i.e., the sum of utilities of users
resulting from the allocation, is maximized. This intractable problem has been studied in both offline and online settings
[21, 23, 29, 32] and various approximation algorithms have been developed. All of them assume access to a value oracle
or a demand oracle. A value oracle is a black box, which given a set of items as a query, returns the value of the itemset.
A demand oracle is a black box, which given an assignment of prices to items, returns the itemset with maximum utility,
i.e., value minus price. Also, the utility function in these settings is typically assumed to be sub-additive and as a result,
this property extends to social welfare. Notably, these works do not consider the interaction of utility-maximizing item
adoption with recursive propagation through a network. On the other hand, they consider more general settings where
the utility functions are user-specific.
Inspired by the economics literature, we base item adoptions on item utility. Specifically, items have a price and a
valuation and the difference is the utility. It is a well-accepted principle in economics and auction theory [21, 44] that
users (agents), presented with a set of items, adopt a subset of items that maximizes their utility. It is this principle that
we use in our framework to govern which users adopt what items.
The use of utility naturally leads to the notion of social welfare and we study the problem of assigning seed nodes
to various items in order to maximize expected social welfare, in a setting where items are complementary. To our
knowledge, in the context of viral marketing, we are the first to study the problem of maximizing (expected) social
welfare.
5
G, V , E, n andm Graph, node set, edge set, number of nodes and number of edges p : E → [0, 1] Influence weight function
I Universe of items P , V , N and U Price, Value, Noise and Utility
®b Budget vector b Maximum budget
𝒮 Seed allocation, i.e. set of node-item pairs S Seed nodes
S𝒮i Seed nodes of item i in allocation𝒮 S𝒮 All seed nodes of allocation𝒮
I𝒮v Items allocated to seed node v in allocation𝒮 R𝒮 (u, t ) and A𝒮 (u, t ) Desire and adoption set of u at time t in allocation𝒮
σ and ρ Expected adoption and social welfare W ,W E ,W N Possible world, edge and noise possible world
Grd andOPT Greedy and optimal allocation B and B A block and a sequence of item disjoint blocks
ei Effective budget of block Bi Bai and ai Anchor block and anchor item of block Bi
Table 1. Table of notations
2.4 Welfare maximization on social networks
There are a few studies related to welfare maximization on social networks, but they all have significant differences
with our model and problem setting. Sun et al. [49] study participation maximization in the context of online discussion
forums. An item in that context is a discussion topic, and adopting an item means posting or replying on the topic. Item
adoptions do propagate in the network, but (a) item propagations are independent (i.e., valuation of itemsets is additive
rather than supermodular or submodular), and (b) they have a budget on the number of items each seed node can be
allocated with, rather than on the number of seeds each item can be allocated to as studied in our model. Bhattacharya
et al. [4] consider item allocations to nodes for welfare maximization in a network with network externalities, but
the major differences with our problem are: (a) they use network externalities to model social influence, i.e., a user’s
valuation of an item is affected by the number of her one- or two-hop neighbors in the network adopting the same
item, but network externalities do not model the propagation of influence and item adoptions, our main focus in
modeling the viral marketing effect; (b) they consider unit demand or bounded demand on each node, which means
items are competing against one another on every node, while our study focuses on the case of complementary items
rather than competing items, and item bundling is a key component in our solution; (c) they do not have budget
on items so an item could be allocated to any number of nodes, while we have a budget on the number of nodes
that can be allocated to an item as seeds and we rely on propagation for more nodes to adopt items. Despite these
major differences, we will do an empirical comparison of our algorithm versus their algorithms to demonstrate that
with propagation we can achieve the same social welfare with only a fraction of item budgets used in their solution.
Abramowitz and Anshelevich [2] study network formation with various constraints to maximize social welfare, but it
has no item allocation, no item complementarity, and no influence propagation, and thus is further away from our
work. In summary, to our knowledge, our study is the only one addressing social welfare maximization in a network
with influence propagation, complementary items, and budget limits on items.
3 UIC MODEL
In this section, we propose a novel model called utility driven independent cascade model (UIC for short) that combines
the diffusion dynamics of the classic IC model with an item adoption framework where decisions are governed by
utility. Table 1 summarizes the notations used henceforth.
3.1 Utility based adoption
Utility is a widely studied concept in economics and is used to model item adoption decisions of users [23, 40, 45]. We
next briefly review utility and provide the specific formulation we use in this paper. For general definitions related to
utility, the reader is referred to [23, 45]
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We let I denote a finite universe of items. The utility of a set of items I ⊆ I for a user is the pay-off of I to the user and
depends on the aggregate effect of three components: the price P that the user needs to pay, the valuationV that the
user has for I and a random noise term N , used to model the uncertainty in our knowledge of the user’s valuation on
items, where P,V and N are all set functions over items. For an item i ∈ I, P(i) > 0 denotes its price. We assume that
price is additive, i.e., for an itemset I ⊆ I, P(I ) = ∑i ∈I P(i). Notice that UIC can handle any generic valuation function.
In §4 we focus on complementary products. Hence we assume thatV is supermodular (definition in §2), meaning that
the marginal value of an item with respect to an itemset I increases as I grows. We also assumeV is monotone since
it is a natural property for valuations. For i ∈ I, N(i) ∼ Di denotes the noise term associated with item i , where the
noise may be drawn from any distribution Di having a zero mean. Every item has an independent noise distribution.
For a set of items I ⊆ I, we assume the noise is additive, i.e., the noise of I , N(I ) := ∑i ∈I N(i). Similar assumptions on
additive noise are used in economics theory [25, 27].
Finally, the utility of an itemset I is U(I ) = V(I ) − P(I ) + N(I ). Since noise is a random variable, utility is also
random. Since noise is drawn from a zero mean distribution, E[U(I )] = V(I ) − P(I ). We assumeV(∅) = 0.
3.2 Diffusion Dynamics
3.2.1 Seed allocation. Let ®b = (b1, ...,b |I |) be a vector of natural numbers representing the budgets associated with
the items. An item’s budget specifies the number of seed nodes that may be assigned to that item. We sometimes
abuse notation and write bi ∈ ®b to indicate that bi is one of the item budgets. We denote the maximum budget as
b :=max{bi | bi ∈ ®b}. We define an allocation as a relation 𝒮 ⊂ V × I such that ∀i ∈ I : |{(v, i) | v ∈ V }| ≤ bi . In words,
each item is assigned a set of nodes whose size is under the item’s budget. We refer to the nodes S𝒮i := {v | (v, i) ∈ 𝒮}
as the seed nodes of 𝒮 for item i and to the nodes S𝒮 := ⋃i ∈I S𝒮i as the seed nodes of 𝒮 . We denote the set of items
allocated to a node v ∈ V as I𝒮v := {i ∈ I | (v, i) ∈ 𝒮}.
3.2.2 Desire and adoption. Every node maintains two sets of items – desire set and adoption set. Desire set is the
set of items that the node has been informed about (and thus potentially desires), via propagation or seeding. Adoption
set is the subset of the desire set that the node adopts. At any time a node selects, from its desire set at that time, the
subset of items that maximizes the utility, and adopts it. If there is a tie in the maximum utility between itemsets, then
it is broken in favor of larger itemsets. We later show in Lemma 1 of §4.1 that breaking ties in this way results in a
well-defined adoption behavior of the nodes. Following previous literature, we consider a progressive model: once a
node desires an item, it remains in the node’s desire set forever; similarly, once an item is adopted by a node, it cannot
be unadopted later.
For a node u, R𝒮 (u, t) denotes its desire set andA𝒮 (u, t) denotes its adoption set at time t , pertinent to an allocation
𝒮 . We omit the time argument t to refer to the adoption (desire) set at the end of diffusion.
We now present the diffusion process of UIC.
3.2.3 The diffusion model. In the beginning of any diffusion, the noise terms of all items are sampled, which are
then used till the diffusion terminates. The diffusion then proceeds in discrete time steps, starting from t = 1. Given
an allocation 𝒮 at t = 1, the seed nodes have their desire sets initialized : ∀v ∈ S𝒮 , R𝒮 (v, 1) = I𝒮v . Seed nodes then
adopt the subset of items from the desire set that maximizes the utility, breaking ties if needed in favor of sets of larger
cardinality. Thus, a seed node may adopt just a subset of items allocated to it.
Once a seed node u ′ adopts an item i , it influences its out-neighbor u with probability pu′,u , and if it succeeds, then i
is added to the desire set of u at time t = 2. The rest of the diffusion process is described in Fig. 1.
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1. Edge transition. At every time step t > 1, for a node u ′ that has adopted at least one new item at t − 1, its
outgoing edges are tested for transition. For an untested edge (u ′,u), flip a biased coin independently: (u ′,u) is
live w.p. pu′,u and blocked w.p. 1 − pu′,u . Each edge is tested at most once in the entire diffusion process and its
status is remembered for the duration of a diffusion process.
Then for each node u that has at least one in-neighbor u ′ (with a live edge (u ′,u)) which adopted at least one
item at t − 1, u is tested for possible item adoption (2-3 below).
2. Generating desire Set. The desire set of node u at time t ,
R𝒮 (u, t) = R𝒮 (u, t − 1) ∪u′∈N −(u) (A𝒮 (u ′, t − 1)), where N−(u) = {u ′ | (u ′,u) is live} denotes the set of
in-neighbors of u having a live edge connecting to u.
3. Node adoption. Node u determines the utilities for all subsets of items of the desire set R𝒮 (u, t). u then adopts
a set T ∗ ⊆ R𝒮 (u, t) such that T ∗ = argmaxT ∈2R𝒮 (u,t ) {U(T ) | T ⊇ A𝒮 (u, t − 1) ∧ U(T ) ≥ 0}. A𝒮 (u, t) is set
to T ∗.
Fig. 1. Diffusion dynamics under UIC model
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Fig. 2. Illustrating propagation of items under UIC model; for simplicity, we assume noise is zero.
We illustrate the diffusion under UIC using an example shown in Figure 2. The graph G with edge probabilities
and the utilities of the two items after sampling the noise terms, are shown on the left side. At time t = 1, node v1 is
seeded with item i1 and v3 with i2, hence they desire those items respectively. Since i1 (resp. i2) has a positive (resp.
negative) individual utility, v1 adopts i1 (resp. v3 does not adopt i2). However i2 remains in the desire set of v3. Then
at t = 2, outgoing edges of v1 are tested for transition: edge (v1,v3) fails (shown as red dotted line), but edge (v1,v2)
succeeds (green solid line). Consequently v2 desires and adopts i1. Next at t = 3, v2’s outgoing edge (v2,v3) is tested.
As it succeeds, v3 desires i1. Since it already had i2 in its desire set, it adopts the set {i1, i2}. Since there is no outgoing
edge from v3, the propagation ends.
3.3 Definition of Social welfare Maximization
LetG = (V ,E,p) be a social network, I the universe of items under consideration. Here, we consider a novel utility-based
objective called social welfare, which is the sum of all users’ utilities of itemsets adopted by them after propagation
converges. Formally, E[U(A𝒮 (u))] is the expected utility that a user u enjoys for a seed allocation 𝒮 after propagation
ends. Then the expected social welfare (also known as “consumer surplus” in algorithmic game theory) for 𝒮 , is
ρ(𝒮) = ∑u ∈V E[U(A𝒮 (u))], where the expectation is over both the randomness of propagation and randomness of
noise.
Key features of UIC.
Our utility driven model has several benefits over existing models.
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Firstly, the seed users in our model are treated as rational users. Thus they also go through the same utility based
decision making like every other user of the network.
Secondly, Com-IC cannot handle the arrival of a set of items together. It had to use arbitrary tie-breaking in a case
when a node becomes aware more than one items simultaneously, to put an order in the adoption. In UIC, we treat this
by creating an explicit desire set for nodes first. The utility is a set function as opposed to the point probability of GAP.
Therefore even if more than one items arrive at the same time instance, the utility can treat them as a set, without the
need of enforcing an explicit order.
Third, the notion of utility opens up a whole new objective of social welfare maximization, where instead of
maximizing just the adoption, the utility earned from the adoptions is aimed to be maximized. No other model reported
to date, has been able to study social welfare maximization. UIC is the first framework which enables the study of utility
in IM context.
Fourth, for complimentary products under UIC, a greedy allocation algorithm that preserves 1 − 1e approximation
guaranty with respect to optimal social welfare, although social welfare is not submodular in seed size. This greedy
algorithm is independent of the model parameters. Hence it can be easily extended to multiple items, whereas for
Com-IC extending the algorithm beyond two items was difficult due to parameter explosion.
We define the problem of maximizing expected social welfare (WelMax) as follows. We refer to V,P,N , as the
model parameters and denote them collectively as Param.
Problem 1. [WelMax] GivenG = (V ,E,p), the set of model parameters Param, and budget vector ®b, find a seed allocation
𝒮∗, such that ∀i ∈ I, |S𝒮∗i | ≤ bi and 𝒮∗ maximizes the expected social welfare, i.e., 𝒮∗ = argmax𝒮 ρ(𝒮).
Unfortunately, WelMax is NP-hard.
Proposition 1. WelMax in the UIC model is NP-hard.
Proof. It is easy to verify that Influence maximization under the IC model, an NP hard problem, is a special case of
WelMax.
The result follows from the fact that the IM problem under the IC model is a special case of WelMax: let I = {i},
setV(i) = 1, P(i) = 0 and set the noise term for item i to 0. This makesU(i) = 1 so any influenced node will adopt i .
Thus, the expected social welfare is simply the expected spread. We know maximizing expected spread under the IC
model is NP-hard [30]. □
3.3.1 Function Types. Notice that the functionsV andU are functions over sets of items, whereas σ is a function
over sets of network nodes, and ρ is a function over allocations, which are sets of (node, item) pairs. When we speak of
a certain property (e.g., submodularity) of a function of a given type, the property is meant w.r.t. the applicable type.
E.g., σ is monotone and submodular w.r.t. sets of nodes.
3.3.2 Design choices. In the UIC model, the desire set of a user is triggered either by seeding or by the influence on
a user as her peers adopt items. Thus following standard practice in IM models, we keep it progressive: a desire set
never shrinks. On the other hand, the adoption decisions are driven by a standard assumption in economics [5], that
users aim to maximize the utility when they adopt item(sets). UIC inherits this assumption to govern adoption decisions
of the users. In UIC, we assume price is additive. There are different ways of pricing a bundle of items: additivity is a
simple and natural pricing model in the absence of discounts [12]. Further, we use supermodular value functions to
model the effect of complementarity which follows the standard practice in the economics literature [38, 53]. Finally,
9
our way of modeling the noise can be viewed as reflecting the uncertainty in the population’s reaction to an item. One
may further introduce personalized noise to model individual uncertainty, but this would make algorithm design and
analysis more difficult. Our approximation bound would not hold when noise is personalized and when valuation is not
supermodular. Although we make specific design choices in this work for simplicity and tractability of the model, the
UIC model can encompass any general form of value, price, and noise parameters and works for any triggering model
[30].
4 UIC FOR COMPLEMENTARY PRODUCTS
In this section, we focus on a setting where the items are mutually complementary, by modeling user valuation for
itemsets as a supermodular function. Recall that a function f : 2U → R is supermodular if for any subsets S ⊂ T ⊂ U
and item x ∈ U \ T , f (S ∪ {x}) − f (S) ≤ f (T ∪ {x}) − f (T ). Supermodularity captures the intuition that between
complementary items, the marginal value-gain of an item w.r.t. a set of items increases as the set grows. Many companies
offer complementary products, e.g., Apple offers iPhone, and AirPod. The marginal value-gain of AirPod is higher for a
user who has bought an iPhone, compared to a user who hasn’t. Complementary items have been well studied in the
economics literature and supermodular function is a typical way for modeling their valuations (e.g., see [9, 53]). As a
preview, our experiments show that complementary items are natural and that their valuation is indeed supermodular.
We study adoptions of complementary items, by combining a basic stochastic diffusion model with the utility model for
item adoption. The highlights of the section are as follows:
1. We propose a greedy allocation algorithm, and show that the algorithm achieves a (1−1/e−ϵ)-approximation ratio,
even though the social welfare function is neither submodular nor supermodular (§4.1 and §4.2). Our main technical
contribution is the block accounting method, which distributes social welfare to properly defined item blocks. The
analysis is highly nontrivial and may be of independent interest to other studies.
2. We design a prefix-preserving seed selection algorithm for multi-item IM that may be of independent interest, with
running time and memory usage in the same order as the scalable approximation algorithm IMM [51] on the maximum
budgeted item, regardless of the number of items (§4.2).
3. We conduct detailed experiments comparing the performance of our algorithm with baselines on five large
real networks, with both real and synthetic utility configurations. Our results show that our algorithm significantly
dominates the baselines in terms of running time or expected social welfare or both (§4.3).
4.1 Properties Of UIC Under Supermodular Valuations
Since WelMax is NP-hard, we explore properties of the welfare function – monotonicity and submodularity, which
can help us design efficient approximation strategies. We begin with an equivalent possible world model to help our
analysis.
4.1.1 Possible world model. Given an instance ⟨G,Param⟩ of UIC, where G = (V ,E,p), we define a possible world
associated with the instance, as a pairW = (W E ,W N ), whereW E is an edge possible world (edge world), andW N is a
noise possible world (noise world);W E is a sample graph drawn from the distribution associated with G by sampling
edges, andW N is a sample of noise terms for each item in I, drawn from the corresponding item’s noise distribution in
Param.
As all the random terms are sampled, propagation and adoption inW is fully deterministic. For nodes u,v ∈ V , we
say v is reachable from u inW if there is a directed path from u to v in the deterministic graphW E . NW (i) denotes the
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sampled noise for item i andUW (I ) denotes the (deterministic) utility of itemset I , in worldW . For a node u and an
allocation 𝒮 , we denote its desire and adoption sets at time t in worldW as R𝒮W (u, t) and A𝒮W (u, t) respectively. When
only the noise terms are sampled, i.e., in a noise worldW N , the utilities are deterministic, but the propagation remains
random.
Given a possible worldW = (W E ,W N ) and an allocation 𝒮 , a node v ∈ V adopts a set of items as follows: (i) if
v is a seed node, then it desires I𝒮v at time t = 1 and adopts an itemset A𝒮W (v, 1) := argmax{UW (I ) | I ⊆ I𝒮v }; (ii)
if v is a non-seed node, and t > 1, then it desires the itemset R𝒮W (v, t) := (
⋃
u ∈N −1W (v)A
𝒮
W (u, t − 1)) ∪ R𝒮W (v, t − 1),
where N−1W (v) denotes the in-neighbors of v in the deterministic graphW E , i.e., at time t , node v desires items that
it desired at (t − 1) as well as items any of its in-neighbors inW E adopted at (t − 1); node v then adopts the itemset
A𝒮W (v, t) := argmax{UW (I ) | I ⊆ R𝒮W (v, t) & A𝒮W (v, t − 1) ⊆ I }. If there is more than one itemset in R𝒮W (v, t) with
the same maximum utility, we assume that v breaks ties in favor of the set with the larger cardinality.
V(·) is supermodular while P(·) andNW (·) are additive and hence modular, so it immediately follows thatUW (·) is
supermodular with respect to sets of items. Thus the expectation of utility w.r.t. edge worlds is supermodular. However,
UW N is not monotone, because adding an item with a very high price may decrease the utility.
We will show a basic property, which helps us showing that the adoption behavior of the nodes is well defined
in U IC . In any possible world, given a set of items that a node desires, there is a unique set of items that it adopts.
Specifically, if there are multiple sets tied for utility, the node will adopt their union. For a set function f : 2U → R, we
define f (T | S) = f (S ∪T ) − f (S).
We say that an itemset A is a local maximum w.r.t. the utility functionUW , if the utility of A is the maximum among
all its subsets, i.e.,UW (A) = maxA′⊆AUW (A′). The following lemma is based on simple algebraic manipulations on
the definitions of supermodularity and local maximum.
Lemma 1. (Local maximum). LetW be a possible world andA,B ⊆ I be any itemsets such thatA andB are local maximum
with respect toUW . Then (A ∪ B) is also a local maximum with respect toUW , i.e.,UW (A ∪ B) = maxC⊆A∪B UW (C).
Proof. For any subset C ⊆ A ∪ B, we have
UW (C) = UW (C \ B | B ∩C) +UW (B ∩C)
≤ UW (C \ B | B) +UW (B) (1)
= UW (C ∪ B)
= UW (B | C \ B) +UW (C \ B)
≤ UW (B | A) +UW (A) (2)
= UW (A ∪ B).
Inequality (1) follows from applying supermodularity ofUW on the first term, and applying local maximum of B on the
second term. Inequality (2) follows applying supermodularity ofUW on the first term, and applying local maximum of
A on the second term. □
An immediate consequence of Lemma 1 is that when two itemsets have the same largest utility, their union must also
have the largest utility, and thus our tie-breaking rule is well-defined. Another consequence is the following lemma.
Lemma 2. For any node u and any time t , the itemset adopted by u at time t , A𝒮W (u, t), must be a local maximum.
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Proof. We prove by an induction on t . The base case of t = 1 is true because by the model, node u adopts the
local maximum among all subsets of items allocated to it. For the induction step, suppose for a contradiction that
A𝒮W (u, t) is not a local maximum but A𝒮W (u, t − 1) is a local maximum. Then there must exist a C ⊂ A𝒮W (u, t) that
is a local maximum andUW (C) > UW (A𝒮W (u, t)). By Lemma 1, C ∪ A𝒮W (u, t − 1) is also a local maximum, and thus
C ∪ A𝒮W (u, t − 1) cannot be A𝒮W (u, t). But sinceUW (C ∪ A𝒮W (u, t − 1)) ≥ UW (C) > UW (A𝒮W (u, t)), u should adopt
C ∪ A𝒮W (u, t − 1) instead of A𝒮W (u, t), a contradiction. □
Our next result shows that in any given possible world, adoption of items propagates through reachability. Reachability
is a key property to be used later in Lemmas 5 and 7 while establishing the approximation guarantee of our algorithm.
Lemma 3. (Reachability). For any item i and any possible worldW , if a nodeu adopts i under allocation𝒮 , then all nodes
that are reachable from u in the worldW also adopt i .
Proof. Consider a possible worldW and a node u that adopts item i . Consider any node v reachable from u inW
that does not adopt i . Let (u,v1, ...,vk ,v) be a path inW E . Assume w.l.o.g. that v is the first node on the path that does
not adopt i . A𝒮W (vk , t) and A𝒮W (v, t + 1) respectively are the itemsets adopted by vk at time t and by v at time t + 1.
Let J = A𝒮W (vk , t) ∪ A𝒮W (v, t + 1). Clearly i ∈ J and J ⊂ R𝒮W (v, t + 1), desire set of v at t + 1. We know that both
A𝒮W (vk , t) and A𝒮W (v, t + 1) are local maximums by Lemma 2. Then by Lemma 1, J is also a local maximum, hence
utilW (J ) ≥ utilW (A𝒮W (v, t + 1)), asA𝒮W (v, t + 1) ⊂ J . Also, |J | > |A𝒮W (v, t + 1)|, as J contains at least one more item i .
Thus as per our diffusion model v at time t should adopt the larger cardinality set J . Hence i is adopted by v . □
The social welfare of an allocation 𝒮 in a possible world W = (W E ,W N ) is defined as the sum of utilities of
itemsets adopted by nodes, i.e., ρW (𝒮) := ∑v ∈V U(A𝒮W (v)). The expected social welfare of an allocation 𝒮 is ρ(𝒮) :=
EW E [EW N [ρW (𝒮)]] = EW N [EW E [ρW (𝒮)]]. It is straightforward to show that the expected social welfare of allocation
𝒮 defined in §3.3 is equivalent to the above definition.
We now proceed to investigate the properties of social welfare.
4.1.2 Properties of social welfare. The following theorem summarizes the property of social welfare function.
The key intuition is that in each possible world, the social welfare is monotone, a result proved by induction on the
propagation time. However it is not submodular because the valuation is supermodular, and it is not supermodular
because the propagation based on IC model would have submodular influence coverage.
Theorem 1. Expected social welfare is monotone with respect to the sets of node-item allocation pairs. However it is
neither submodular nor supermodular.
Proof. To prove monotonicity, we show by induction on propagation time that the social welfare in any worldW is
monotone. The result follows upon taking expectation. Consider allocations 𝒮 ⊆ 𝒮 ′ and any node v .
Base Case: At t = 1, desire happens by seeding. By assumption, I𝒮v ⊆ I𝒮
′
v . Thus, R𝒮W (v, 1) ⊆ R𝒮
′
W (v, 1), where R𝒮W (v, 1)
denotes the desire set of v in worldW under allocation 𝒮 . Suppose J := A𝒮W (v, 1) \ A𝒮
′
W (v, 1) is non-empty. From
the semantics of adoption of itemsets, we have UW (J | A𝒮W (v, 1) \ J ) ≥ 0. Now, A𝒮W (v, 1) \ J ⊆ A𝒮
′
W (v, 1). By
supermodularity of utility,UW (J | A𝒮′W (v, 1)) ≥ 0. Since J ⊆ A𝒮W (v, 1) ⊆ R𝒮W (v, 1) ⊆ R𝒮
′
W (v, 1), by the semantics of
itemset adoption, the set J ∪ A𝒮′W (v, 1) will be adopted by v at time 1, a contradiction to the assumption that A𝒮
′
W (v, 1)
is the adopted itemset by v at time 1.
Induction: By Lemma 3, we know that once a node adopts an item, all nodes reachable from it inW E also adopt that
item. Furthermore, reachability is monotone in seed sets. From this, it follows that A𝒮W (v,τ + 1) ⊆ A𝒮
′
W (v,τ + 1).
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Define A𝒮W (v) :=
⋃
t A𝒮W (v, t). By definition, an adopted itemset has a non-negative utility, so we have ρW (𝒮) =∑
v ∈V UW (A𝒮W (v)) ≤
∑
v ∈V UW (A𝒮
′
W (v)) = ρW (𝒮 ′). This shows that the social welfare in any possible world is
monotone, as was to be shown.
For submodularity and supermodularity, we give counterexamples. Consider a network with single node u and two
items i1 and i2. Let P(i1) > V(i1) and P(i2) > V(i2). HoweverV({i1, i2}) > P(i1) + P(i2). Assume that noise terms
are bounded random variables, i.e., |N(i j )| ≤ |V(i j ) − P(i j )|, j = 1, 2. Thus expected individual utility of i1 or i2 is
negative, but when they are offered together, the expected utility is positive. Now consider two seed allocations 𝒮 = ∅
and 𝒮 ′ = {(u, i1)}. Let the additional allocation pair be (u, i2). Now ρ(𝒮 ∪ {(u, i2)}) − ρ(𝒮) = 0 − 0 = 0: for 𝒮 , no items
are adopted and for 𝒮 ∪ {(u, i2)} the noiseN(i2) cannot affect adoption decision in any possible world, so i2 will not be
adopted by u in any world.
However, ρ(𝒮 ′ ∪ {(u, i2)}) − ρ(𝒮 ′) > 0, as under allocation 𝒮 ′, i1 is not adopted by u in any world, while un-
der allocation 𝒮 ′ ∪ {(u, i2)}, u will adopt {i1, i2} in every world, resulting in positive social welfare and breaking
submodularity.
For supermodularity, consider a network consisting of two nodes v1 and v2 with a single directed edge from v1 to v2,
with probability 1. Let there be one item i whose deterministic utility is positive, i.e.,V(i) > P(i). Again, assume that
the noise termN(i) is a bounded random variable, i.e., |N(i)| ≤ |V(i) − P(i)|. Now consider two seed allocations 𝒮 = ∅
and 𝒮 ′ = {(v1, i)}. Let the additional pair be (v2, i). Under allocation 𝒮 ′, both nodes v1 and v2 will adopt i in every
possible world. Hence adding the additional pair (v2, i) does not change item adoption in any world and consequently
the expected social welfare is unchanged. Thus we have,
ρ(𝒮 ∪ {(v2, i)}) − ρ(𝒮) = E[U(i1)] > 0
= ρ(𝒮 ′ ∪ {(v2, i)}) − ρ(𝒮 ′)
which breaks supermodularity. □
The node level adoption exhibits supermodularity because the utility function is supermodular, but the propagation
behavior is governed by reachability (Lemma 3), and thus exhibits submodularity. Therefore, the combined propagation
and adoption behavior in UIC exhibits a complicated behavior that is neither submodular nor supermodular. In the next
section, we will show that surprisingly, despite such complicated behavior, we can still design a greedy algorithm that
achieves a (1 − 1/e − ϵ)-approximation to optimal expected social welfare.
4.2 Approximation Algorithm
4.2.1 Greedy algorithm overview. Given that the welfare function is neither submodular nor supermodular,
designing an approximation algorithm for WelMax is challenging. Nevertheless, in this section we show that for
any given ϵ > 0 and number ℓ ≥ 1, a (1 − 1e − ϵ)-approximation to the optimal social welfare can be achieved with
probability at least 1 − 1|V |ℓ , using a simple greedy algorithm. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first instance in
the context of viral marketing where an efficient approximation algorithm is proposed for a non-submodular objective, at
the same level as submodular objectives. We first present our algorithm and then analyze its correctness and efficiency.
Our algorithm, called bundleGRD (for bundle greedy) and shown in Algorithm 1, is based on a greedy allocation of
seed nodes to items. Given a graph G, the universe of items I, item budget vector ®b, ϵ , and ℓ, bundleGRD first selects
(line 2) the top-b seed nodes SGrd := Sb for the IC model (disregarding item utilities), where b = max{bi | bi ∈ ®b}.
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Algorithm 1: bundleGRD(I, ®b,G, ϵ, ℓ)
1 𝒮Grd ← ∅;
2 SGrd ← PRIMA(®b,G, ϵ, ℓ)
3 for i ∈ I do
4 Assign item i to the first bi nodes of the ranked set SGrd , i.e., SGrdi ← top bi nodes from SGrd
5 𝒮Grd ← 𝒮Grd ∪ (SGrdi × {i})
6 return 𝒮Grd as the final allocation
Then, (line 4) for each item i with budget bi , it assigns the top-bi nodes from SGrd to i . We will show that this allocation
achieves a (1 − 1e − ϵ)-approximation to the optimal expected social welfare. For this to work, the seed selection
algorithm must ensure that the b seeds selected, Sb , satisfy a prefix-preserving property (definition in §4.2.3). That is,
intuitively, for every budget bi ∈ ®b, the top-bi seeds among SGrd must provide a (1 − 1e − ϵ)-approximation to the
optimal expected spread under budget bi . This property is ensured by invoking the PRIMA algorithm (Algorithm 2) in
line 2 of Algorithm 1. The following is the main result for the bundleGRD algorithm.
Theorem 2. Let 𝒮Grd be the greedy allocation generated by bundleGRD, and 𝒮OPT be the optimal allocation. Given
ϵ > 0 and ℓ > 0, with probability at least 1 − 1|V |ℓ , we have
ρ(𝒮Grd ) ≥ (1 − 1
e
− ϵ) · ρ(𝒮OPT ). (3)
The running time is O((b + ℓ + logn | ®b |)(m + n) logn/ϵ2).
We note that our bundleGRD algorithm has the interesting property that it does not need the valuation functions,
prices, and the distributions of noises as input, and thus works for all possible utility settings. It reflects the power of
bundling — as long as we know that all items are mutually complementary, then bundling them together as much as
possible would always provide a good solution in terms of social welfare, no matter what the actual utilities. This is
in stark contrast with the algorithmic solution in [36] for the complementary setting. Further, known algorithms for
social welfare maximization in the combinatorial auction literature typically assume a value oracle (e.g., see [23, 29, 32]),
which given a query as an itemset, returns the utility of the itemset. Works on IM for complementary items [36], require
the knowledge of adoption probabilities of every item given already adopted item subsets. However, such an oracle can
be quite expensive to realize in practice for non-additive utility functions, since there are exponentially many itemsets.
In §4.2.2, we show the approximation guarantee of our algorithm through the novel block accounting method, then in
§4.2.3 we describe the prefix preserving influence maximization algorithm PRIMA. Algorithm 2 is described and its
correctness and running time complexity are established in §4.2.3.
4.2.2 Block accounting to analyze bundleGRD. The analysis of the algorithm is highly non-trivial, because it
needs to consider all possible seed allocations, propagation scenarios, with budgets possibly being non-uniform among
items. Our main idea is a “block” based accounting method: we break the set of items into a sequence of “atomic” blocks,
such that each block has non-negative marginal utility given previous blocks, and it can be counted as an atomic unit in
the diffusion process. Then we account for each block’s contribution to the social welfare during a propagation, and
argue that for every block, the contribution of the block achieved by the greedy allocation is always at least (1− 1/e − ϵ)
times the contribution under any allocation. In §4.2.2.1 we first introduce the block generation process. Then using
block based accounting, in §4.2.2.2 we establish the welfare produced by bundleGRD, and later in §4.2.2.3, show an
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upper bound on the welfare produced by any arbitrary allocation. The technical subtlety includes properly defining the
blocks, showing why each block can be accounted for as an atomic unit separately, dealing with partial item propagation
within blocks, etc.
In the rest of the analysis, we fix the noise worldW N , and prove that ρW N (𝒮Grd ) ≥ (1 − 1e − ϵ) · ρW N (𝒮OPT ),
where ρW N denotes the expected social welfare under the fixed noise worldW N . We could then simply take another
expectation over the distribution ofW N to obtain Inequality (3). Let UW N be the utility function under the noise
possible worldW N .
GivenW N , let I∗
W N
⊆ I be the subset of items that gives the largest utility inW N , with ties broken in favor of larger
sets. By Lemma 1, I∗
W N
is unique. This implies that the marginal utility of any (non-empty) subset of I \ I∗
W N
given
I∗
W N
is strictly negative. Further recall thatUW N is supermodular. Hence the marginal utility of any subset of I \ I∗W N
given any subset of I∗
W N
is strictly negative, which means no items in I \ I∗
W N
can ever be adopted by any user under
the noise worldW N . Thus, once we fixW N , we can safely remove all items in I \ I∗
W N
from consideration. In the rest
of §4.2.2, for simplicity we use I∗ as a shorthand for I∗
W N
.
4.2.2.1 Block generation process.We divide items in I∗ into a sequence of disjoint blocks such that each block has
a non-negative marginal utility w.r.t. the union of all its preceding blocks. We also need to carefully arrange items
according to their budgets for later accounting analysis. We next discuss how the blocks are generated.
Let I∗ = {i1, ..., i |I∗ |}. We order the items in non-increasing order of their budgets, i.e., b1 ≥ b2 ≥ · · · ≥ b |I∗ | .
Figure 3 shows the process of generating the blocks. Note that this block generation process is solely used for our
accounting analysis and is not part of our seed allocation algorithm. Hence it has no impact on the running time whatsoever
Given I∗ andW N , we first generate a global sequence I of all non-empty subsets of I∗, following a precedence order ≺
(Step 2), explained next.
For any two distinct subsets S, S ′ ⊆ I∗, arrange items in each of S, S ′ in decreasing order of item indices. Compare
items in S, S ′, starting from the highest indexed items of S and S ′. If they match then compare the second highest
indexed items and so on until one of the following rules applies:
1. One of S or S ′ exhausts. If say S exhausts first, then S ≺ S ′.
2. The current pair of items in S and S ′ do not match. Then S ≺ S ′, if the current item of S has a lower index than the
current item of S ′.
We illustrate this step using the following example.
Example 1 (Generation of I). Suppose we have three items I∗ = {i1, i2, i3} with b1 ≥ b2 ≥ b3, then we order the subsets
in the following way: I = ({i1}, {i2}, {i1, i2}, {i3}, {i1, i3}, {i2, i3}, {i1, i2, i3}). Between subsets {i3} and {i1, i3}, {i3} is
ordered first according to rule 1, whereas between {i1, i2} and {i3}, {i1, i2} is ordered first according to rule 2. □
The sequence I has the following useful property:
Property 1. For any subsets S andT in the sequence I, if (a)T is a proper subset of S , or (b) the highest index among all
items in T is strictly lower than the highest index among all items in S , then T appears before S in I.
From I, blocks are selected following an iterative process, as shown in Step 3 of Figure 3. We scan through this
sequence, with the purpose of generating a sequence B of disjoint blocks. For each subset B being scanned, if its
marginal utility given all previously selected blocks is non-negative, i.e.,UW N (B |
⋃B) ≥ 0, where B is the currently
selected sequence of blocks, and
⋃B is the union of all items in these selected blocks, then we append B to the end of
selected sequence B, i.e., B = B ⊕ B, where ⊕ denotes “append”. After selecting B, we remove all subsets in I that
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1. Input for the process contains I∗ andW N .
2. Generate the 2 |I∗ | − 1 non-empty subsets of I∗
Sort the subsets following the precendence order ≺. Put the sorted subsets in sequence I
B ← ∅; B ← the first entry in I
3. Repeat the following steps until I is empty
(1) If UW N (B |
⋃B) ≥ 0 then,
B ← B ⊕ B i.e., append B at the end of sequence B
remove all sets B′ from I with B′ ∩ B , ∅
B ← the first entry in I
(2) Else B ← the next entry in I after B
4. B is the final sequence of blocks
Fig. 3. The block generation process
overlap with B, and restart the scan from the beginning of the remaining sequence. IfUW N (B |
⋃B) < 0, then we skip
this set and go to the next one.
Example 2 illustrates the process.
Example 2 (Block generation). Continuing from Example 1, assume the following utility assignments for noise world
W N :
UW N (i1) = UW N (i2) = UW N (i3) = UW N (i1, i2) = −1
UW N (i1, i3) = UW N (i2, i3) = 1; UW N (i1, i2, i3) = 4
Then as per the block generation process, {i1, i3} will be chosen as the first block B1, since it is the first block in I with
non-negative marginal utility w.r.t. ∅. Once B1 is chosen all itemsets containing i1 or i3 are deleted from I, thus only
{i2} remains in I. SinceUW N ({i2} | {i1, i3}) = UW N (i1, i2, i3) −UW N (i1, i3) = 4− 1 > 0, {i2} is chosen as B2 and the
process terminates with B = ({i1, i3}, {i2}). □
By the fact that I∗ is a local maximum, it is easy to see that the blocks generated form a partition of I∗. Let
B ={B1,B2, . . . ,Bt } be the sequence of blocks generated, where t is the number of blocks in the block partition. We
define the marginal gain of each block Bi as
∆i = UW N (Bi | ∪i−1j=1Bj ). (4)
We have the following properties regarding the marginal gains.
Property 2. ∀i ∈ [t], ∆i ≥ 0 , andUW N (I∗) =
∑t
i=1 ∆i .
Let A ⊆ I∗ be an arbitrary subset of items. We partition A based on block partition B: Define Ai = A ∩ Bi ,∀i ∈ [t].
If Ai = Bi , we call Ai a full block, if Ai = ∅, then it is an empty block, otherwise, we call it a partial block. Define
∆Ai = UW N (Ai | A1 ∪ . . . ∪Ai−1). By Property 1 and the fact that Bi is the first block in I with non-negative marginal
utility w.r.t.
⋃i−1
j=1 Bj , it follows that
Property 3. ∀i ∈ [t], ∆Ai ≤ ∆i , andUW N (A) =
∑t
i=1 ∆
A
i .
Using this property, we devise our accounting where each Ai contributes ∆Ai in its social welfare.
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4.2.2.2 Social welfare under greedy allocation. We are now ready to analyze the social welfare of our greedy
allocation (Algorithm 1) using block accounting. We first show that, before the propagation starts, each seed node
would adopt exactly the prefix of full blocks allocated until the first non-full block, and then show that all these adopted
full blocks will propagate together, so we can exactly account for the contribution of each block to the expected social
welfare. The following lemma gives the exact statement of the first part.
Lemma 4. Under the greedy allocation, suppose that at a seed node v , Ai is the first non-full block assigned to v , then
before the propagation starts, v adopts exactly B1 ∪ ... ∪ Bi−1.
Proof. This proof relies on the supermodularity of UW N , the block generation process, the greedy allocation
procedure, and Property 3. Let M be the set of items adopted by v before the propagation starts, and let M1 =
M ∩ (B1 ∪ ... ∪ Bi−1) andM2 = M \M1. Since Ai is a partial block, we know thatM2 , Bi . We first show thatM2 = ∅
and thenM1 = B1 ∪ ... ∪ Bi−1.
Suppose, for a contradiction, thatM2 , ∅. We know thatUW N (M2 | M1) ≥ 0, and by supermodularityUW N (M2 |
B1 ∪ ... ∪ Bi−1) ≥ 0. IfM2 is ordered before Bi in sequence I, thenM2 should be selected instead of Bi , a contradiction.
IfM2 is ordered after Bi in I, by the block generation process we can conclude that all items in Bi have budgets no less
than the minimum budget for items inM2, which by greedy allocation implies that all items in Bi should be allocated
to v , contradicting the fact Ai is a partial block. ThusM2 = ∅ andM = M1 ⊆ B1 ∪ ... ∪ Bi−1.
Next, by Property 3,
UW N (M) =
i−1∑
j=1
∆Mi ≤
i−1∑
j=1
∆i = UW N (B1 ∪ ... ∪ Bi−1)
Thus v should adopt B1 ∪ ... ∪ Bi−1 instead ofM . □
Effective budget of blocks. For a block Bi , we define its effective budget ei = minj ∈B1∪···∪Bi bj . In bundleGRD
(Algorithm 1), the first ei seed nodes of SGrd are assigned all the full blocks {B1∪ ...∪Bi }. By Lemma 4, only those nodes
actually adopt the block Bi before the propagation starts. Such seed nodes are called effective seed nodes of block Bi and
denoted as SGrdEBi . Thus in summary, under the greedy allocation, before the propagation starts, all seed nodes in S
GrdE
Bi
adopt Bi together with B1, . . . ,Bi−1, and none of the seed nodes outside SGrdEBi adopts any items in Bi ,Bi+1, . . . ,Bt .
As established, the nodes in SGrdEBi always adopt Bi together with B1, . . . ,Bi−1 and without considering the effect of
propagation, no other seed nodes outside the set SGrdEBi adopts Bi or any other blocks Bi+1, . . . ,Bt . Bi is not adopted
because at least one of the previous B1, ...,Bi−1 blocks is not allocated to those nodes. Also since Bi is not adopted,
none of the subsequent blocks can be adopted. We illustrate this using an example next.
Example 3 (Block budgets). Revisit the blocks shown in Example 2. Let us assume that b1 > b2 > b3. Recall that
B1 = {i1, i3} and B2 = {i2}. Let S2, S3 be the top b2,b3 nodes in the greedy allocation respectively, and S3 ⊂ S2.
Then under the greedy allocation, B2 as a full block will be allocated to nodes in S2. The effective budget of B2 is
e2 = minj ∈B1∪B2 bj = b3. The effective seed set of B2 is SGrdEB2 = S3, since nodes in S3 are allocated both B1 and B2 and
will adopt both B1 and B2 according to Lemma 4 (can also be verified by checking the utility settings given in Example
2 manually). For nodes in S2 \ S3, even though they are allocated the full block B2, they are only allocated a partial
block A1 = {i1}, and thus by Lemma 4 they will not adopt B2 or A1. □
We are now ready to show the social welfare of the allocation made by bundleGRD.
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Lemma 5. Let 𝒮Grd be the greedy allocation obtained using Algorithm 1. Then the expected social welfare of 𝒮Grd in
W N is ρW N (𝒮Grd ) =
∑
i ∈[t ] σ (SGrdEBi ) · ∆i , where S
GrdE
Bi
are the effective seed nodes of block Bi under allocation 𝒮Grd ,
σ (·) is the expected spread function under the IC model, and ∆i is as defined in Eq. (4).
Proof. To account for the effect of propagation, we use the Reachability Lemma (Lemma 3). By that lemma, nodes
reachable from SGrdEBi adopt all the blocks B1, ...,Bi . For a full block Bi only the effective seeds of Bi and nodes reachable
from them adopt Bi . Thus the expected number of nodes that are reached by block Bi and consequently adopt Bi , is
σ (SGrdEBi ). From Property 2, adoption of every such Bi contributes ∆i to the overall social welfare. Moreover, the only
item adoptions are disjoint union of full blocks. Hence ρW N (𝒮Grd ) =
∑
i ∈[t ] σ (SGrdEBi ) · ∆i . □
4.2.2.3 Social welfare under an arbitrary allocation.
Unlike greedy, in an arbitrary allocation, for the effective seed nodes, we cannot conclude that a block Bi is offered
with all previous full blocks B1, . . . ,Bi−1. Thus our accounting method needs to be adjusted. Our idea is to define the
key concept of an anchor item ai for every block Bi , which appears in B1 ∪ · · · ∪ Bi . We want to show that only when
Bi is co-adopted with ai by any node, Bi could contribute positive marginal social welfare (Lemma 6), and in this case
its marginal contribution is upper bounded by ∆i (Property 3). Hence we only need to track the diffusion of the anchor
item ai to account for the marginal contribution of Bi . Finally by showing that the budget of ai is exactly the effective
budget ei = |SGrdEBi | of Bi , we conclude that σ (Sai ) ≤ (1 − 1/e − ϵ) σ (S
GrdE
Bi
) by the prefix preserving property explained
in §4.2.1.
We define the budget of a block to be the minimum budget of any item in the block. Then the anchor block Bai , of a
block Bi is the block from B1, . . . ,Bi that has the minimum budget. In case of a tie, the block having highest index is
chosen as the anchor block. Notice that anchor item ai is the highest indexed and consequently minimum budgeted
item in its corresponding anchor block Bai . Notice that, by definition, if block Bj is the anchor block of block Bi with
j < i , then block Bj is also the anchor block for all blocks Bj ,Bj+1, . . . ,Bi . Moreover, the effective budget ei of a block
Bi , is the budget of its anchor item ai , i.e., the minimum budget of all items in B1 ∪ · · · ∪ Bi . We illustrate the concept
of anchor block and item using the example below.
Example 4 (Anchor block and item). Anchor block of block B2 in Example 3, is Ba2 = B1. Its corresponding anchor
item a2 is the highest indexed item of block Ba2 , i.e., i3. Block B1’s anchor block is the block itself and consequently its
anchor item a1 is again i3. □
Lemma 6. Let ai be the anchor item of Bi , and suppose ai appears in Bj , j ≤ i . During the diffusion process from an
arbitrary seed allocation 𝒮 , let A be the set of items in Bj ∪ . . . ∪ Bi that have been adopted by v by time t . If ai < A and
A , ∅, thenUW N (A | B1 . . . ,Bj−1) < 0.
Proof. Suppose thatUW N (A | B1 ∪ · · · ∪ Bj−1) ≥ 0. By the definition of the anchor item, we know that all items in
A\Bj have strictly larger budget than the budget of ai , otherwise one of items inA\Bj should be the anchor item for Bi .
This means all items inA\Bj have index strictly lower than ai . Notice ai < A, and thus all items inA∩Bj also have index
strictly lower than ai . Then by Property 1, A should appear before Bj in sequence I. SinceUW N (A | B1 . . . ,Bj−1) ≥ 0,
the block generation process should select A as the j-th block instead of the current Bj , a contradiction. □
Using the above result, we establish the following lemma, which upper bounds the welfare produced by an arbitrary
allocation.
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Lemma 7. For any arbitrary seed allocation𝒮 , the expected social welfare inW N is ρW N (𝒮) ≤
∑
i ∈[t ] σ (Sai ) ·∆i , where
Sai is the seed set assigned to the anchor item ai of block Bi , and ∆i is as defined in Eq. (4).
Proof. For an edge possible worldW E , suppose that after the diffusion process underW E , every node v adopts
item set Av . Let Av,i = Av ∩ Bi for all i ∈ [t], and ∆Avi = UW N (Av,i | Av,1 ∪ . . . ∪Av,i−1). Thus, we have
ρW N (𝒮) = EW E
[∑
v ∈V
UW N (Av )
]
= EW E

∑
v ∈V
∑
i ∈[t ]
∆Avi

=
∑
i ∈[t ]
EW E
[∑
v ∈V
∆Avi
]
, (5)
where the expectation is taken over the randomness of the edge possible worlds, and thus we use subscriptW E under
the expectation sign to make it explicit. By switching the summation signs and the expectation sign in the last equality
above, we show that the expected social welfare can be accounted as the summation among all blocks Bi of the expected
marginal gain of block Bi on all nodes. We next bound EW E
[∑
v ∈V ∆Avi
]
for each block Bi .
Under the edge possible worldW E , for each v ∈ V , there are three possible cases for Av,i . In the first case, Av,i = ∅.
In this case, ∆Avi = 0, so we do not need to count the marginal gain ∆
Av
i . In the second case, Av,i is not empty but it
does not co-occur with block Bi ’s anchor ai , that is ai < Av , and Av,i , ∅. In this case, Let A′ = A ∩ (Bj ∪ . . . ∪ Bi ),
where Bj is the anchor block of Bi . Then A′ is not empty and we knowUW N (A′ | B1 ∪ . . . ∪ Bj−1) < 0. Since we have
UW N (A′ | B1 ∪ . . . ∪ Bj−1) =
∑i
j′=j ∆
Av
j′ . Thus the cumulative marginal gain of ∆
Av
j′ with j ≤ j ′ ≤ i is negative, so we
can relax them to 0, effectively not counting the marginal gain of ∆Avi either.
Finally, Av,i is non-empty and co-occur with its anchor ai , i.e. ai ∈ A and Av,i , ∅. Since Av is a partial block,
∆Avi ≤ ∆i , we relax ∆Avi to ∆i . This relaxation occurs only on nodes that adopt ai . A node v could adopt ai only when
there is a path inW E from a seed node that adopts ai to node v . As defined in the lemma, Sai is the set of seed nodes of
ai . Let Γ(Sai ,W E ) be the set of nodes that are reachable from Sai inW E . Then, there are at most |Γ(Sai ,W E )| nodes at
which we relax ∆Avi to ∆i for block Bi . Hence,
∑
v ∈V
∆Avi ≤ |Γ(Sai ,W E )| · ∆i . (6)
Furthermore, notice that EW E [|Γ(Sai ,W E )|] = σ (Sai ), by the live-edge representation of the IC model. Therefore,
together with Eq. (5) and (6), we have
ρW N (𝒮) ≤
∑
i ∈[t ]
EW E
[
|Γ(Sai ,W E )| · ∆i
]
=
∑
i ∈[t ]
σ (Sai ) · ∆i .
This concludes the proof of the lemma. □
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Notice in Lemma 7, |Sai | ≤ ei , whereas in Lemma 5 |SGrdEBi | = ei . Hence the combination of Lemma 5 and Lemma 7,
together with the fact that SGrdEBi is a (1 − 1/e − ϵ)-approximation of the optimal solution with ei seeds (by the prefix-
preserving property), leads to the approximation guarantee of bundleGRD (Eq. (3) of Theorem 2), which we prove
next.
Theorem 3. (Correctness of bundleGRD) Let𝒮Grd be the greedy allocation and𝒮 be any arbitrary allocation. Given
ϵ > 0 and ℓ > 0, the expected social welfare ρ(𝒮Grd ) ≥ (1 − 1e − ϵ) · ρ(𝒮) with at least 1 − 1|V |ℓ probability.
Proof. From Lemma 5 , we have for a possible worldW N = (W E ,W N ), ρW N (𝒮Grd ) =
∑
i ∈[t ] σ (SGrdEBi ) · ∆i , where
the size of SGrdEBi is the effective budget of Bi .
For an arbitrary allocation 𝒮 , since ai is the anchor item of Bi , by its definition we know that |Sai | = |SGrdEBi |. By the
correctness of the prefix-preserve influence maximization algorithm we use in line 2 (Definition 1, to be instantiated
in §4.2.3), we have that with probability at least 1 − 1|V |ℓ , σ (SGrdEBi ) ≥ (1 −
1
e − ϵ)σ (Sai ), for all blocks Bi ’s and their
corresponding anchors ai ’s.
Let the distribution of worldW N be DN . Then, together with Lemma 7, we have that with probability at least
1 − 1|V |ℓ ,
ρ(𝒮Grd ) = EW N ∼DN [ρW N (𝒮Grd )]
= EW N ∼DN

∑
i ∈[t ]
σ (SGrdEBi ) · ∆i

≥ EW N ∼DN

∑
i ∈[t ]
(1 − 1
e
− ϵ)σ (Sai ) · ∆i

≥ (1 − 1
e
− ϵ)EW N ∼DN [ρW N (𝒮)]
= (1 − 1
e
− ϵ)ρ(𝒮).
Therefore, the theorem holds. □
In the following section, we explain the component PRIMA that provides the prefix preserving property.
4.2.3 Item-wise prefix preserving IMM. We first formally define the prefix-preserving property.
Definition 1. (Prefix-Preserving Property). GivenG = (V ,E,p) and budget vector ®b, an influence maximization
algorithmA is prefix-preserving w.r.t. ®b, if for any ϵ > 0 and ℓ > 0,A returns an ordered set SGrd
b
of sizeb, such that with
probability at least 1− 1|V |ℓ , for everybi ∈ ®b, the top-bi nodes of SGrdb , denoted S
Grd
bi
, satisfies σ (SGrdbi ) ≥ (1 −
1
e − ϵ)OPTbi ,
whereOPTbi is the optimal expected spread ofbi nodes.
Unfortunately, state-of-the-art IM algorithms such as IMM [51], SSA [43], and OPIM [50] are not prefix-preserving
out-of-the-box. In this section, we present a non-trivial extension of IMM [51], called PRIMA (PRefix preserving IM
Algorithm) (Algorithm 2), to make it prefix-preserving. The classical models of influence propagation assume a single
item and IMM is one of the state of the art algorithms for influence maximization. For a single item, as well as for multiple
items with uniform budgets, the prefix property is trivial. In the presence of multiple items with non-uniform budgets,
an algorithm that returns a seed set of high quality with only a probabilistic guarantee need not satisfy the prefix
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Algorithm 2: PRIMA (®b,G, ϵ, ℓ)
1 Initialize R = ∅, s = 1, n = |V |, i = 1, ϵ ′ = √2 · ϵ , budgetSwitch = false;
2 ℓ = ℓ + log 2/logn, ℓ′ = logn (nℓ · | ®b |);
3 while i ≤ log2(n) − 1 and s ≤ |®b | do
4 k = bs , LB = 1;
5 x = n2i ; θi = λ
′
k/x , where λ′k is defined in Eq. (7);
6 while |R | ≤ θi do
7 Generate an RR set for a randomly selected node v of G and insert in R;
8 if budgetSwitch then
9 Sk = the first k nodes in the ordered set Sbs−1 returned from the previous call to NodeSelection
10 else
11 Sk = NodeSelection(R,k)
12 if n · FR (Sk ) ≥ (1 + ϵ ′) · x then
13 LB = n · FR(Sk )/(1 + ϵ ′);
14 θk = λ
∗
k/LB, where λ∗k is defined in Eq. (8);
15 while |R | < θk do
16 Generate an RR set for a randomly selected node v of G and insert in R;
17 s = s + 1; budgetSwitch = true
18 else
19 i = i + 1; budgetSwitch = false
20 if s ≤ |®b | then
21 θk = λ
∗
bs
/LB;
22 R = ∅;
23 while |R | < θk do
24 Generate an RR set for a randomly selected node v of G and insert in R;
25 Sb = NodeSelection(R,b);
26 return Sb as the final seed set;
preserving property (Definition 1). We present PRIMA (PRefix IMM), shown in Algorithm 2, which is a prefix-preserving
extension of IMM for multiple items. Notice that NodeSelection(R,k) is the standard greedy algorithm for finding a
seed set of size k by solving max k-cover on the set of RR sets R. For more details, the reader is referred to [51]. The
NodeSelection algorithm used in PRIMA is same as Alg 1 of IMM, which we donot repeat for brevity.
State-of-the-art IM algorithms including IMM use reverse influence sampling (RIS) approach [6] governed by reverse-
reachable (RR) sets. An RR set is a random set of nodes sampled from the graph by (a) first selecting a node v uniformly
at random from the graph, and (b) then simulating the reverse propagation of the model (e.g., IC model) and adding all
visited nodes into the RR set. The main property of a random RR set R is that: influence spread σ (S) = n ·E[I{S ∩R , ∅}]
for any seed set S , where I is the indicator function. After finding large enough number of RR sets, the original influence
maximization problem is turned into a k-max coverage problem – finding the set of k nodes that covers the most
number of RR sets, where a set S covers an RR set R if S ∩ R , ∅. All RIS algorithms use the same well-known coverage
procedure, denoted asNodeSelection(R,k) in [51], and thus we omit its description here. These algorithms mainly differ
in estimating the number of RR sets needed for the approximation guarantee. The number of RR sets generated by these
algorithms is in general not monotone with the budget k , making them not prefix preserving. Our PRIMA algorithm
carefully addresses this issue, even with nonuniform item budgets, while keeping the efficiency of the algorithm.
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PRIMA ingests four inputs, namely the budget vector ®b, graph G, ϵ and ℓ, with ®b sorted in non-increasing order
as stated in Definition 1. Given ℓ, for a budget k , IMM generates a set of RR sets R, such that |R | ≥ λ∗k/OPTk with
probability at least 1− 1/nℓ . PRIMA derives a number ℓ′ > ℓ as a function of ℓ (Algorithm 2, line 2), the details of which
we provide in Lemma 9. Before that, we briefly describe PRIMA. Extending the bounding technique of [51], for each
budget k , we set
λ′k =
(2 + 23ϵ ′) · (log
(n
k
)
+ ℓ′ · log n + log log2 n) · n
ϵ ′2
, (7)
λ∗k = 2n · ((1 − 1/e) · α + βk )2 · ϵ−2, (8)
where, α =
√
ℓ′ logn + log 2 is a constant independent of k , and βk =
√
(1 − 1/e) · (log (nk ) + ℓ′ log n + log 2). Note that
we use log without a base to represent the natural logarithm.
The basic idea of PRIMA is to generate enough RR sets such that for any budget k ∈ ®b, |R | ≥ λ∗k/OPTk , with
probability at least 1− 1/nℓ′ . Since OPTk is unknown, we rely on a good lower bound of OPTk , i.e., LBk , as proposed in
IMM [51]. Specifically PRIMA starts from the highest budget, i.e., b1. For a given budget k ∈ ®b and i it samples enough
RR sets into R first (lines 6-7) and then checks the coverage condition on the sampled set of RR sets (line 12). Note if R
already had enough number of RR sets (generated at a previous budget), then it skips RR set generation and moves
directly to coverage check. If the coverage condition succeeds, then a good LB for the budget k is determined. It uses
the LB to find the required number of RR sets (lines 14-16) for k and moves to the next budget. It then reuses the prefix
of the ordered seed set found for budget k as the seed set found for the new budget, avoiding a redundant call to the
NodeSelection procedure. This is fine because NodeSelection is a deterministic greedy procedure in finding seed nodes,
and the last call to NodeSelection before the budget switch, is using the same RR set collection R with a larger budget,
and thus it already found all the seed nodes for the new budget. If the coverage condition fails, it increments i to sample
more RR sets for the current budget k (line 19).
If for any budget, all possible i values are tested, PRIMA breaks the for-loop and generates RR sets (for that budget)
using LB = 1 (line 21), which is the lowest possible value of LB. Further, since budgets are sorted in non-increasing
order and λ∗k is monotone in k (Eq. (8)), there cannot be any remaining budget k
′, where k ′ ≤ k , for which λ∗k ′/LB (line
21) is higher. Hence the RR set generation process terminates.
Lastly, after determining |R |, thosemany RR sets are generated from scratch (line 23) onwhich the finalNodeSelection
is invoked. This addresses a recently found issue of the original IMM algorithm [13]. PRIMA then returns the top-b
seeds obtained from NodeSelection (line 25).
The correctness and the running time of the PRIMA algorithm mainly follow the proof of the IMM algorithm [13, 51].
We first show the correctness and towards that we prove that the following lemma holds.
Lemma 8. Let R be the final set of RR sets generated by PRIMA at the end and let k ∈ ®b be any budget. Then |R | ≥
λ∗k/OPTk holds with probability at least 1 − 1/nℓ
′
.
Proof. Given x ∈ [1,n], ϵ ′ and δ3 ∈ (0, 1) and a budget k . Let Sk be the seed set of size k obtained by invoking
NodeSelection(R,k), where,
|R | ≥ (2 +
2
3ϵ
′) · (log (nk ) + log(1/δ3))
ϵ ′ ·
n
x
. (9)
Then, from Lemma 6 of [51], if OPTk < x , then n · FR (Sk ) < (1 + ϵ ′) · x with probability at least (1 − δ3). Now let
j = ⌈log2 nOPTk ⌉. By union bound, we can infer that PRIMA has probability at most (j − 1)/(nℓ
′ · log2 n) to satisfy the
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coverage condition of line 12 for the budget k . Then by Lemma 7 of [51] and the union bound, PRIMA will satisfy
LBk ≤ OPTk with probability at least 1−nℓ′ . We know that for any k ∈ ®b, |R | ≥ λ∗k/LBk , hence the lemma follows. □
We are now ready to prove the correctness of PRIMA.
Lemma 9. PRIMA returns a prefix preserving (1− 1/e − ϵ)-approximate solution Sb to the optimal expected spread, with
probability at least 1 − 1/nℓ .
Proof. We know from Lemma 8 that the RR set sampling for any budget can result in the coverage condition
(Algorithm 2, line 12) failing with probability at most 1/nℓ′ . By applying union bound over all the budgets, we have that
the failure probability of the coverage condition in PRIMA is at most
∑
k ∈®b 1/nℓ
′
= | ®b | ·1/nℓ′ . By setting ℓ′ = logn (nℓ · | ®b |),
we bound this failure probability to at most 1/nℓ . Thus ℓ′ is used for computing α and βk in Eq. (8). Further once θk is
determined, we generate those many RR set from scratch. This follows the fix proposed in [13] for a bug in Theorem 1
of [51]. Without the fix, the top Sb nodes returned by the last call to NodeSelection (line 25), cannot be shown to have
a (1 − 1/e − ϵ)-approximate solution with probability at least 1 − 1/nℓ . For every budget bi ∈ ®b, we can then choose the
prefix of top-bi nodes of Sb and use that as a solution Sbi for that budget, with the guarantee that with probability at
least 1 − 1/nℓ each Sbi is a (1 − 1/e − ϵ)-approximate solution to OPTbi .
By union bound, PRIMA returns a (1 − 1/e − ϵ)-approximate prefix preserving solution with probability at least
1 − 2/nℓ .
Finally by increasing ℓ to ℓ + log 2/logn in line 2, we raise PRIMA’s probability of success to 1 − 1/nℓ . □
Running time
The running time of PRIMA essentially involves two parts: the time needed to generate the set of RR sets R and
the total time of all NodeSelection invocations. From Lemma 9 of [51], we have for any budget k , the set of RR sets
generated for that budget Rk satisfies,
E[|Rk |] ≤
3max{λ∗k , λ′k } · (1 + ϵ ′)2
(1 − 1/e) · OPTk
.
Since λ′k and λ
∗
k are both monotone in k (Eq. ((7)) and ((8))), we know their maximums are achieved for k = b.
Further let OPTmin := OPTb |I| be the minimum expected spread, i.e., minimum value of OPT , across all budgets,
then for any Rk ,
E[|Rk |] ≤
3max{λ∗
b
, λ′
b
} · (1 + ϵ ′)2
(1 − 1/e) · OPTmin
= O((b + ℓ′)n log n · ϵ−2/OPTmin ).
Further since PRIMA reuses the RR sets instead of generating them from scratch for every budget, for the RR set R
generated by PRIMA,
E[|R|] =maxk ∈®b {E[|Rk |]}
= O((b + ℓ′)n log n · ϵ−2/OPTmin ). (10)
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For an RR set R ∈ R, letw(R) denote the number of edges in G pointing to nodes in R. If EPT is the expected value
of w(R), then we know, n · EPT ≤ m · OPTmin [51]. Hence using Eq. (10), the expected total time to generate R is
determined by,
E[
∑
R∈R
w(R)] = E[|R|] · EPT
= O((b + ℓ′)(n +m) log n · ϵ−2). (11)
Notice that generating RR set from scratch for the final node selection, following the fix of [13], only adds a
multiplicative factor of 2. Hence the overall asymptotic running time to generate R remains unaffected. Thus intuitively,
there are two changes in PRIMA’s running time. The budget k of a single item of IMM is replaced with b, the maximum
budget of any item. Secondly, by applying union bound on every individual item’s failure probability, a factor of logn | ®b |
is added to the sample complexity. Using Lemma 9 and Eq. (11) we now prove the correctness and the running time
result of PRIMA.
Theorem 4. PRIMA is prefix preserving and returns a (1 − 1/e − ϵ)-approximate solution to IM with at least 1 − 1/nℓ
probability in O((b + ℓ + logn | ®b |)(n +m) log n · ϵ−2) expected time.
Proof. From Lemma 9, we have that PRIMA returns a prefix preserving (1 − 1/e − ϵ)-approximate solution with at
least 1− 1/nℓ probability. In that process PRIMA invokes NodeSelection, log2 n − 1 times in the while loop and once to
find the final seed set Sb . Note that, we intentionally avoid redundant calls to NodeSelection when we switch budgets,
which saves | ®b | additional calls to NodeSelection.
Let Ri be the susbset of R used in the i-th iteration of the loop. Since NodeSelection involves one pass over all
RR set, on a given input Ri , it takes O(∑R∈Ri |R |) time. Recall |Ri | doubles with every increment of i . Hence it is a
geometric sequence with a common ratio of 2. Now from Theorem 3 of [51] and the fact that there is no additional calls
to NodeSelection during budget switch, we have total cost of invoking all NodeSelection is O(E[∑R∈R |R |]).
Since |R | ≤ w(R), for any R ∈ R, then using Eq. (11) we have,
O(E[
∑
R∈R
|R |]) = O(E[
∑
R∈R
w(R)])
= O((b + ℓ′)(n +m) log n · ϵ−2)
= O((b + ℓ + logn | ®b |)(n +m) log n · ϵ−2).
Hence the theorem follows. □
Finally, the combination of Theorems 3 and 4 gives our main Theorem 2.
4.3 Experiments
4.3.1 Experiment Setup. We perform extensive experiments on five real social networks. We first experiment with
synthetic utility (value and price) functions. For real utility functions, we learn the value and noise distributions of items
from the bidding data in eBay, and obtain item prices from Craigslist and Facebook groups to make them compatible
with used items auctioned in eBay. All experiments are performed on a Linux machine with Intel Xeon 2.6 GHz CPU
and 128 GB RAM.
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Flixster Douban-Book Douban-Movie Twitter Orkut
# nodes 7.6K 23.3K 34.9K 41.7M 3.07M
# edges 71.7K 141K 274K 1.47G 234M
avg. degree 9.43 6.5 7.9 70.5 77.5
type undirected directed directed directed undirected
Table 2. Network Statistics
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Fig. 4. Expected social welfare in four configurations (on the Douban-Movie network)
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Fig. 5. Running times of bundleGRD, RR-SIM+, RR-CIM, item-disj and bundle-disj (on Configuration 1)
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Fig. 6. Number of RR sets generated by bundleGRD, RR-SIM+, RR-CIM, item-disj and bundle-disj (on Configuration 1)
4.3.1.1 Networks. Table 2 summarizes the networks and their characteristics. Flixster is mined in [36] from a social
movie site and a strongly connected component is extracted. Douban is a Chinese social network, where users rate books,
movies, music, etc. In [36] all movie and book ratings of the users in the graph are crawled separately to derive two
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Fig. 7. Expected social welfare in four configurations (on the Twitter network)
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Fig. 8. (a) Impact of number of items on the running time and (b-d) Experiments using real Param (on the Twitter net-
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Fig. 9. (a-c) Comparison against BDHS algorithms and (d) Scalability of bundleGRD
datasets from book and movie ratings: Douban-Book and Douban-Movie. Twitter is one of the largest public network
datasets. Finally Orkut is a large social network that we use to test scalability. Both Twitter and Orkut can be obtained
from [1].
4.3.1.2 Algorithms compared. We compare bundleGRD against six baselines – RR-SIM+, RR-CIM, item-disj,
bundle-disj, BDHS-Concave and BDHS-Step. RR-SIM+ and RR-CIM are two state-of-the art algorithms designed
for complementary products in the context of IM [36]. However, they work only for two items. Extending the Com-IC
framework and the RR-SIM+ and RR-CIM algorithms for more than two items is highly non-trivial as that requires
dealing with automata with exponentially many states. Hence in comparing the performance of bundleGRD against
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No Price Value Noise GAP Budget
1
i1 = 3
i2 = 4
{i1, i2} = 7
i1 = 3, i2 = 4
{i1, i2} = 8 i1 : N (0, 1)i2 : N (0, 1)
{i1, i2} : N (0, 2)
qi1 | ∅ = 0.5, qi2 | ∅ = 0.5
qi1 |i2 = 0.84,qi2 |i1 = 0.84
Uniform
2 Nonuniform
3 i1 = 3, i2 = 3
{i1, i2} = 8
qi1 | ∅ = 0.5, qi2 | ∅ = 0.16
qi1 |i2 = 0.98,qi2 |i1 = 0.84
Uniform
4 Nonuniform
Table 3. Two item configurations
RR-SIM+ and RR-CIM, we limit the number of items to two. Later we experiment with more than two items. Below, by
deterministic utility of an itemset I , we meanV(I ) − P(I ), i.e., its utility with the noise term ignored.
(1) Com-IC baselines. For two items i1 and i2, given seed set of item i2 (resp. i1), RR-SIM+ (resp. RR-CIM) finds
seed set of item i1 (resp. i2) such that expected number of adoptions of i1 is maximized. Initial seeds of i2 (resp.
i1) are chosen using IMM [51].
(2) Item-disjoint. Our next baseline item-disj allocates only one item to every seed node. Given the set of items I,
item-disj finds
∑
i ∈I bi nodes, say L, using IMM [51], where bi is the budget of item i . Then it visits items in L in
non-increasing order of budgets, assigns item i to first bi nodes and removes those bi nodes from L. By explicitly
assigning every item to different seeds, item-disj does not leverage the effect of supermodularity. However it
benefits from the network propagation: since the utilities are supermodular, if more neighbors of a node adopt
some item, it is more likely that the node will also adopt an item. Thus, when individual items have positive
utility and hence can be adopted and propagate on their own, by choosing more seeds, item-disj makes use of
the network propagation to encourage more adoptions.
(3) Bundle-disjoint. Baseline bundle-disj, aims to leverage both supermodularity and network propagation. It first
orders the items I in non-increasing budget order and determines successively minimum sized subsets with
non-negative deterministic utility, maintaining these subsets (“bundles”) in a list. Items in each bundle B are
allocated to a new set of bB := min{bi | i ∈ B} seed nodes. The budget of each item in B is decremented by bB ,
and items with budget 0 are removed. When no more bundles can be found, we revisit each item i with a positive
unused budget and repeatedly allocate it to the seeds of the first existing bundle B which does not contain i . If
bB > bi (where bi is the current budget of i after all deductions), then the first bi seeds from the seed set of B are
assigned to i . If an item i still has a surplus budget, we select bi fresh seeds using IMM and assign them to i .
(4) Welfare maximization baselines. Our last two baselines, BDHS-Concave and BDHS-Step are two state-of-
the-art welfare maximization algorithms under network externalities [4]. As discussed in § 2, their study has
significant differences from our study, but we still make an empirical comparison with their algorithms with the
goal to explore what fraction of the budget is needed by our model with network propagation to achieve the
same social welfare as their model which has network externality but no network propagation. We defer the
details of the comparison method to § 4.3.4.
4.3.1.3 Default Parameters. Following previous works [26, 43] we set probability of edge e = (u,v) to 1/din (v).
Unless otherwise specified, we use ϵ = 0.5 and ℓ = 1 as our default for all five methods as recommended in [36, 51].
The Com-IC algorithms RR-SIM+ and RR-CIM use adoption probabilities, called GAP parameters [36], to model the
interaction between items. The GAP parameters can be simulated within the UIC framework using utilities shown in
Eq. (12). The derivation follows simple algebra. Here, qi1 | ∅ (resp., qi1 |i2 ) denotes the probability that a user adopts item
i1 given that it has adopted nothing (resp., item i2).
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Let i1 and i2 be the two items. Suppose the desire set of a node u only has item i1. The condition that u adopts i1 is
V(i1) − P(i1) +N(i1) ≥ 0. Thus the GAP parameter qi1 | ∅ is given by:
qi1 | ∅ = Pr[V(i1) − P(i1) +N(i1) ≥ 0] = Pr[N(i1) ≥ P(i1) − V(i1)].
Now suppose i1 has been adopted by u, and i2 enters the desire set. The GAP parameter qi2 |i1 is the probability of
adopting i2 given that i1 has been adopted. So we have
qi2 |i1 = Pr[V({i1, i2}) − P(i1) − P(i2) +N(i1) +N(i2) ≥
V(i1) − P(i1) +N(i1) | N(i1) ≥ P(i1) − V(i1)]
= Pr[N(i2) ≥ P(i2) − (V({i1, i2}) − V(i1)) | N(i1) ≥
P(i1) − V(i1)].
Since noise N(i2) is independent of noise N(i1), we can remove the above condition in the conditional probability, and
obtain
qi2 |i1 = Pr{N(i2) ≥ P(i2) − (V({i1, i2}) − V(i1))}.
The other two GAP parameters, qi2 | ∅ and qi1 |i2 can be obtained similarly. To summarize, we have
qi1 | ∅ = Pr[N(i1) ≥ P(i1) − V(i1)],
qi1 |i2 = Pr[N(i1) ≥ P(i1) − (V({i1, i2}) − V(i2))], (12)
qi2 | ∅ = Pr[N(i2) ≥ P(i2) − V(i2)],
qi2 |i1 = Pr[N(i2) ≥ P(i2) − (V({i1, i2}) − V(i1))].
4.3.2 Experiments on two items. We explore four different configurations corresponding to the choice of the
values, prices, noise distribution parameters, and item budgets (see Table 3). While UIC does not assume any specific
distribution for noise, in our experiments we use a Gaussian distribution for illustration.
In Configurations 1 and 2, individual items have non-negative deterministic utility. In this setting item-disj and
bundle-disj are equivalent. In Configurations 3 and 4 one item has a negative deterministic utility while the other item
has a non-negative one. In this setting, however, bundleGRD and bundle-disj are equivalent. One may also consider
configurations where every individual item has negative deterministic utility. In such a setting, item-disj produces 0
welfare, which makes the comparison degenerates.
For every parameter setting, we consider two budget settings, namely uniform (e.g., Configuration 1) and non-uniform
(resp. Configuration 2). In case of uniform budget, both items have the same budget k , where k is varied from 10 to 50
in steps of 10. For non-uniform budget, i1’s budget is fixed at 70, and i2’s budget is varied from 30 to 110 in steps of 20.
4.3.2.1 Social Welfare.We compare the expected social welfare achieved by all algorithms on all four configurations
(Fig. 4). We show the results only for Douban-Movie, since the trend of the results is similar on other networks. In
terms of social welfare, bundleGRD achieves an expected social welfare upto 5 times higher than item-disj (Fig. 4(d)).
A similar remark applies when bundle-disj and bundleGRD are not equivalent (e.g., Fig. 4(b)). Further, notice that
RR-SIM+ and RR-CIM produce welfare similar to bundleGRD. It follows from Table 4 of [36] (full arxiv version) that
under this configuration, RR-SIM+ and RR-CIM end up copying the seeds of the other item. Hence their allocations are
similar to bundleGRD. However, as shown next, bundleGRD is much more efficient than the other two algorithms, and
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easily supports more than two items, which makes bundleGRD more suitable in practice for multiple items over large
networks.
4.3.2.2 Running time.We study the running time of all algorithms using Configuration 1 as a representative case. The
results are shown in Fig. 5. As can be seen, bundleGRD and bundle-disj are equivalent and hence have the same running
time. However, bundleGRD significantly outperforms all other baselines on every dataset. RR-SIM+ and RR-CIM are
particularly slow. In fact, on the large Twitter network, they could not finish even after our timeout after 6 hours (hence
they are omitted from Fig. 5(d)). In comparison with the baselines, bundleGRD is upto 5 orders of magnitude (resp.
1.5 times) faster than RR-CIM (resp. item-disj). Running times on other configurations show a similar trend, and are
omitted.
4.3.2.3 Memory. Lastly we study the memory required by all algorithms using Configuration 1. The results are shown
in Fig. 6. Since the amount of memory required is directly related to the number of RR sets each algorithm produces, we
show the RR set numbers in the plots. RR-SIM+ and RR-CIM are based on TIM, whereas the other three algorithms
leverage IMM, which generates much less number of RR sets than TIM. Further for the comic algorithms, the two
separate pass involving forward and backward simulations also results in more RR sets generation.
4.3.3 More than two items. We use the largest dataset Twitter for tests in this subsection.
4.3.3.1 The configurations. Having established the superiority of bundleGRD for two items, we now consider more
than two items. Recall that RR-SIM+ and RR-CIM cannot work with more than two items, so we confine our comparison
to item-disj and bundle-disj. We gauge the performance of the algorithms on social welfare and running time. We also
study the effect of budget distribution on social welfare. We design four configurations corresponding to the choice of
budget and utility (see Table 4). For all configurations, we sample noise terms from N (0, 1). Price and value are set in
such a way as to achieve certain shapes for the set of itemsets in the lattice that have a positive utility (see below).
• Configurations 5-7. Configuration 5 is the simplest: every item has the same budget; price and value are set
such that every item has the same utility of 1 and utility is additive. Thus, by design, this configuration gives
minimal advantage to any algorithm that tries to leverage supermodularity. The next two configurations (6 and
7) model the situation where a single “core” item is necessary in order to make an itemset’s utility positive. E.g.,
a smartphone may be a core item, without which its accessories do not have a positive utility. We set the core
item’s utility to 5. The addition of any other item increases the utility by 2. Thus, all supersets of the core item
have a positive utility, while all other subsets have a negative utility. Hence, the set of subsets with positive
utility forms a “cone” in the itemset lattice. In Configuration 6 (resp. 7), the core item is the item with maximum
(resp. minimum) budget. Finally, we design a more general configuration where the set of itemsets with positive
utility forms an arbitrary shape (see Configuration 8 below).
• Configuration 8. We consider the itemset lattice, with level t having subsets of size t . We randomly set the
prices and values of items in level 1 such that a random subset of items have a non-negative utility. Let At be
any itemset at level t > 1 and i ∈ At any item. We choose a value uniformly at random, ϵ ∼ U [1, 5], and define
V(i |At \ {i}) =maxB∈P(At \{i },t−2){V(i |B) + ϵ} (13)
where P(A,q) denotes the set of subsets of A of size q. That is, the marginal gain of an item i w.r.t. At \ {i} is set
to be the maximum marginal gain of i w.r.t. subsets of At of size t − 2, plus a randomly chosen boost (ϵ). E.g., let
A4 = {i, j,k, l}, t = 4 then,V(i |{j,k, l}) =max{V(i |{j,k}),V(i |{k, l}),V(i |{j, l})} + ϵ .
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No Value Budget
5 Additive Uniform
6 Cone-max Non-uniform
7 Cone-min Non-uniform
8 Level-wise Uniform
Table 4. Multiple item configurations
Recall that the value computation proceeds level-wise starting from level t = 0. Thus, for any itemset At in
Eq.(13),V(i |B) for subsets B is already defined.
Finally, we setV(At ) =maxi ∈At {V(At \ {i}) +V(i |At \ {i})}. Now we show that this way of assigning values
ensures that the value function is well-defined and supermodular.
Lemma 10. The value function of Configuration 8 is supermodular.
Proof. First we show that for an itemset At at level t , and an item i < At ,V(i | At ) ≥ V(i | B), where B ⊂ At is
any subset of At . We prove this claim by induction on level.
Base Case: Let t = 1 and A1 be any singleton itemset. ThenV(i | A1) = V(i | ∅) + ϵ ≥ V(i | ∅).
Induction: Suppose the claim is true for all levels t ≤ l . We show it holds for t = l + 1. From our method of assigning
values we have, V(i | Al+1) = maxBl ∈P(I,l ){V(i | Bl )} + ϵ , where P(I, l) is the set of all itemsets at level l . Thus
V(i | Al+1) ≥ V(i | Bl ). By induction hypothesis,V(i | Bl ) ≥ V(i | B), for any subset B ⊂ Bl , and thusV(i | Al+1) ≥
V(i | B).
It then follows that for any itemsets B ⊂ A ⊂ I and item i ∈ I \ A, V(i | A) ≥ V(i | B). Hence value is
supermodular. □
Lemma 11. The value function of Configuration 8 is well defined.
Proof. We show that for an itemset At at level t ,V(i | At \ {i}) +V(i) = V(j | At \ {j}) +V(j), for any i, j ∈ At .
LetV(At ) =maxk ∈At {V(At \ {k}) +V(k |At \ {k})} =m. Then according to our configurationV(i | At \ {i}) =
m −V(i). SimilarlyV(j | At \ {j}) =m −V(j). HenceV(i | At \ {i}) +V(i) =m −V(i) +V(i) =m −V(j) +V(j) =
V(j | At \ {j}) +V(j). □
4.3.3.2 Social welfare. First, we study the social welfare achieved by the algorithms, in each of the above configurations,
with the total budget varying from 500 to 1000 in steps of 100. For Configurations 7 and 10, we set the budget uniformly
for every item. For other configurations, the max budget is set to 20% of the total budget, min budget to 2%, and the
remaining budget is split uniformly. The results of the experiment on Twitter network are shown in Fig. 7. Under
Configurations 8 and 9, bundleGRD and bundle-disj produces the same allocation, hence the welfare is the same.
However in general bundleGRD outperforms every baseline in all the four configurations by producing welfare up to 4
times higher than baselines.
4.3.3.3 Running time vs number of items. Next, we study the effect of the number of items on the running time
of the algorithms. For this experiment, we use Configuration 5. We set the budget of every item to k = 50 and vary
the number of items s , from 1 to 10. Fig. 8(a) shows the running times on the Twitter dataset. As the number of items
increases the number of seed nodes to be selected for item-disj and bundle-disj increases. Notice both item-disj and
bundle-disj select the same number of seeds, which is k × s . item-disj selects it by one invocation of IMM, with budget
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ks , while bundle-disj invokes IMM s times with budget k for every invocation. So their overall running times differ. By
contrast, the running time of bundleGRD only depends on the maximum budget and is independent of the number of
items. E.g., when number of items is 10, bundleGRD is about 8 times faster than bundle-disj and 2.5 times faster than
item-disj.
4.3.4 Experiment with real value, price, and noise parameters. In this section, we conduct experiments on
parameters (value, price, and noise) learned from real data. We consider the following 5 items: (1) Playstation 4, 500 GB
console, denoted ps , (2) Controller of the Playstation, denoted c , and (3-5) Three different games compatible with ps ,
denoted д1, д2 and д3 respectively. We next describe the method by which we learn their parameters from real data.
4.3.4.1 Learning the value, price, and noise. Predicting a user’s bid in an auction is a widely studied problem in
auction theory. Jiang et al. [27] showed that learning user’s valuations of items improves the prediction accuracy.
Given the bidding history of an item, their method learns a value distribution of the item, by taking into account
hidden/unobserved bids. We use it to learn the values of itemsets from bidding histories. Recall that in our model value
is not random, instead noise models the randomness in valuations. Hence we take the mean of the learned distribution
to be the value and the noise is set to have 0 mean and the same variance as the learnt distribution. While UIC does
not assume specific noise distributions, for concreteness, we fit a Gaussian distribution to noise. We take 10, 000
independent random samples from the learnt distribution to fit the gaussian.
Itemset Price Value Noise eBay bidding link
{ps} 260 213 N (0, 4) https://ebay.to/2ym9Ioj
{ps, c} 280 220 N (0, 6) https://ebay.to/2Escb68
{ps,д1,д2,д3} 275 258 N (0, 4) https://ebay.to/2QYpmxh
{ps,д1,д2, c} 290 292.5 N (0, 5) https://ebay.to/2ClEnF2
{ps,д1,д2,д3, c} 295 302 N (0, 7) https://ebay.to/2P60y99
Table 5. Learned parameters
We mine the bidding histories of different itemsets from eBay. To match the used products bidden in eBay, we use
prices for the used products on Craigslist and Facebook groups. Since the items bidden in eBay are typically used
products, to match them with the right price information, we use Craigslist and Facebook groups where the exact same
old product is sold.
The price obtained is C$260 for ps , C$20 for c , and C$5 each for д1,д2 and д3. For some of the itemsets, we show the
learned parameters and the links to the corresponding eBay bidding histories used in the learning, in Table 5. The rest
of the itemsets are omitted from the table for brevity. We describe the parameters of those omitted itemsets here. Firstly,
any of c,д1,д2,д3, without the core item ps , is useless. Hence values of those items are set to 0. Secondly, we did not
find any bidding record for an itemset consisting of ps, c and a single game. This is perhaps because typically owners of
ps own multiple games and while selling they sell all the games together with ps . Hence, we consider the itemset with
ps, c and a single game to have negative deterministic utility. However, as the table shows, itemsets with ps, c and two
games have non-negative deterministic utility. Finding the bidding history for the exact same games is difficult, so since
games д1–д3 are priced similarly and valued similarly by users, we assume that any itemset with ps, c and any two
games has the same utility as that shown in the fourth row of Table 5. From the value column, we can see that the
items indeed follow supermodular valuation, confirming that in practice complementarity arises naturally. Lastly, the
only itemsets that have positive deterministic utility are itemsets with ps, c and at least two games. All other itemsets
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including the singleton items, have negative deterministic utility. Consequently, we know that the allocation produced
by item-disj will have 0 expected social welfare, so we omit item-disj from our experiments, discussed next.
4.3.4.2 Effect of total budget size.We compare bundleGRD with bundle-disj on the Twitter dataset with different
sizes of total budgets. Given a total budget, we assign 30%, 30%, 20%, 10%, 10% of that to ps, c,д1,д2,д3 respectively.
Then we vary the total budget from 100 to 500 in steps of 100. Fig. 8(b) shows the welfare: as can be seen, bundleGRD
outperforms bundle-disj in both high and low budgets. In fact with higher budget, bundleGRD produces welfare more
than 2 times that of bundle-disj. Next we report the running time of the two algorithms in Fig. 8(c). Since bundle-disj
makes multiple calls to IMM, its running time is 1.5 times higher than bundleGRD.
4.3.4.3 Effect of different item budget given the same total budget. Our next experiment studies the following
question. Suppose we have a fixed total budget which we must be divided up among various items. How would the
social welfare and running time vary for different splits? Since we have seen that in terms of social welfare bundleGRD
dominates all baselines, we use it to measure the welfare. Given a total budget of 500, we split it across 5 items following
three different budget distributions, namely (i) Uniform: each item has the same budget 100, (ii) Large skew: one item,
ps has 82% of the total budget and the remaining 18% is divided evenly among the remaining 4 items; and (iii) Moderate
skew: Budgets of the 5 items, [ps, c,д1,д2,д3], are given by the budget vector ®b = [150, 150, 100, 50, 50].
Fig. 8(d) shows the expected social welfare and the running time of bundleGRD under the three budget distributions
on the Twitter dataset. The welfare is the highest under uniform and worst under large skew, with moderate skew in
between. Running time shows consistent trend, with uniform being the fastest and large skew being the slowest. The
findings are consistent with the observation that with large skew, the number of seeds to be selected increases and the
allocation cannot take full advantage of supermodularity.
4.3.4.4 Effect of propagation vs. network externality.We next compare our bundleGRD against the other two base-
lines, BDHS-Concave and BDHS-Step (referred to as BDHS algorithms for simplicity). BDHS-Concave and BDHS-Step
correspond to the concave and step externality algorithms respectively (i.e. Alg 1 and 3 of [4]). Our overall approach is,
despite the differences between our model and BDHS model as highlighted in §2, we try to convert our model in a
reasonable way to their model by means of restriction, and use their algorithms to find the total social welfare that they
can achieve. Then we gradually increase the budget of items in our model to see at which budget the social welfare
achieved by our solution reaches the social welfare achieved by their solution that has no budget and assigns items to
every node directly. This would demonstrate the budget savings due to our consideration of network propagation.
We now describe how we convert our model to their model. First, our model uses network propagation with the
UIC model while their model uses network externality without propagation. To align the two models, we try two
alternatives. The first alternative is to sample 10,000 live-edge graphs, and the propagation on one live-edge graph bears
similarity with the 1-step function, and thus we use 1-step externality function on each live-edge graph to compute the
total social welfare and then average over all live-edge graphs. We refer to this alternative BDHS-Step. The second
alternative works when we restrict our UIC model such that every edge has the same propbability p. In this case, the
activation probability of a node v is 1 − (1 − p)k , where k is the number of active neighbors of v which is at most the
size s of its 2-neighborhood support set. This resembles the concave function case in the BDHS model, and thus we use
the concave function 1 − (1 − p)s in their 2-hop model. We refer to this alternative BDHS-Concave.
Second, to align their unit demand model with our model, we treat each item subset as a virtual item in their model,
so that they can assign item subsets as one virtual item to the nodes. Finally, their model has no budget, so they are free
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Budget distribution bundleGRD MAX_IMM IMM_MAX
Uniform 37719 37719 37719
Large skew 144328 144328 144328
Moderate skew 50839 50839 50839
Table 6. The number of RR sets generated
to assign all item subsets to all nodes. We use this as a benchmark of the total social welfare they can achieve, and see
at what fraction of the budget we can achieve the same social welfare due to the network propagation effect.
We used the Orkut as one of the large networks in this study, which also enables the study of the performance of
bundleGRD on a large network other than Twitter (which is already used in Figure 5(d), 7, and 8).Fig. 9(a-c) shows
the results on Orkut, Douban-Book and Douban-Movie networks respectively. The x axis shows the fraction of the
budget needed by bundleGRD, where 100% corresponds to a budget of n, i.e., #nodes in the network, which corresponds
to the setting of [4]. As can be seen, for dense networks like Orkut, bundleGRD needs less than 35% as the budget.
We found a similar result on Flixster , not included here for the lack of space. For a sparse graph like Douban-Book it
needs 82%, which is still less than the budget of BDHS. Further, since propagation has a submodular growth, much
of the budget is used to increase the latter half of the welfare. E.g., even on Douban-Book, 75% of BDHS’ welfare is
obtained by only using 50% budget. This test clearly demonstrates that our bundleGRD could leverage the power of
propagation, compared to the BDHS approach that only considers externality.
4.3.4.5 Scalability test. Our next experiment shows the impact of network size on bundleGRD using Orkut with two
types of edge probabilities: (1) 1/din (v) and (2) fixed 0.01. We use a uniform budget of 50 for all items. We then use
breadth-first-search to progressively increase the network size such that it includes a certain percentage of the total
nodes. The results are shown in Fig. 8(d). With increasing network size, the running time in both cases roughly has a
linear increase, whereas the welfare depicts a sublinear growth. It is worth noticing that even for the entire million-sized
network and fixed probability, bundleGRD requires mere 129 (time 2) seconds to complete, which again attests to its
scalability.
4.3.4.6 Memory usage. Lastly we assess the memory usage of bundleGRD. Since the main memory usage is on the RR
set storage, we evaluate the number of RR sets bundleGRD generates in comparison to IMM for the three aforementioned
budget distributions. Since IMM works only with a single item (i.e., one budget), we consider two variants. In the
first variant IMM is invoked with maximum budget, called IMM_MAX. The second variant iterates over all budgets
and reports the budget that generates the maximum number of RR sets, called MAX_IMM. Notice IMM_MAX and
MAX_IMM are not equivalent because the number of RR sets generated by IMM is not monotone in budget. The results
are shown in Table 6. In all three budget configurations the numbers of RR sets generated by the three algorithms are
exactly the same, from which we can conclude that bundleGRD has a similar memory requirement as IMM.
5 SUMMARY & DISCUSSION
We propose a novel model combining influence diffusion with utility-driven item adoption, which supports any mix of
competing and complementary items. Focusing on complementary items, we study the problem of optimizing expected
social welfare. Our objective function is monotone, but neither submodular nor supermodular. Yet, we show that
a simple greedy allocation guarantees a (1 − 1/e − ϵ)-approximation to the optimum. Based on this, we develop a
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scalable approximation algorithm bundleGRD, which satisfies an interesting prefix preserving property. With extensive
experiments, we show that our algorithm outperforms the state of the art baselines.
Our results and techniques carry over unchanged to any triggering propagation model [30]. We assumed that price is
additive and valuations are supermodular. If we use submodular prices, that would further favor item bundling. In this
case, utility remains supermodular and our results remain intact. Independently of this, we could study competition
using submodular value functions. Orthogonally, we can study the UIC model under personalized noise terms. It is
interesting to study the expected welfare maximization problem in these alternative settings.
34
REFERENCES
[1] Twitter dataset. https://snap.stanford.edu/data/. Accessed: 2018-05-30.
[2] Ben Abramowitz and Elliot Anshelevich. Utilitarians without utilities: Maximizing social welfare for graph problems using only ordinal preferences.
In AAAI, pages 894–901, 2018.
[3] Shishir Bharathi, David Kempe, and Mahyar Salek. Competitive influence maximization in social networks. In International Workshop on Web and
Internet Economics, pages 306–311. Springer, 2007.
[4] Sayan Bhattacharya, Wolfgang Dvořák, Monika Henzinger, and Martin Starnberger. Welfare maximization with friends-of-friends network
externalities. Theory of Computing Systems, 61(4):948–986, 2017.
[5] Robin W Boadway and Neil Bruce. Welfare economics. B. Blackwell New York, 1984.
[6] Christian Borgs, Michael Brautbar, Jennifer Chayes, and Brendan Lucier. Maximizing social influence in nearly optimal time. In Proceedings of the
twenty-fifth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms, pages 946–957. SIAM, 2014.
[7] Allan Borodin, Yuval Filmus, and Joel Oren. Threshold models for competitive influence in social networks. In International Workshop on Internet
and Network Economics, pages 539–550. Springer, 2010.
[8] Ceren Budak, Divyakant Agrawal, and Amr El Abbadi. Limiting the spread of misinformation in social networks. In Proceedings of the 20th
international conference on World wide web, pages 665–674. ACM, 2011.
[9] Robert Carbaugh. Contemporary Economics: An Applications Approach. Routledge, 8th edition, 2016.
[10] Tim Carnes, Chandrashekhar Nagarajan, Stefan M Wild, and Anke Van Zuylen. Maximizing influence in a competitive social network: a follower’s
perspective. In Proceedings of the ninth international conference on Electronic commerce, pages 351–360. ACM, 2007.
[11] Parinya Chalermsook, Atish Das Sarma, Ashwin Lall, and Danupon Nanongkai. Social network monetization via sponsored viral marketing. In
ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review, volume 43, pages 259–270. ACM, 2015.
[12] Lena Chang and William B Fairley. Pricing automobile insurance under multivariate classification of risks: additive versus multiplicative. Journal of
Risk and Insurance, 1979.
[13] Wei Chen. An issue in the martingale analysis of the influence maximization algorithm imm. arXiv preprint arXiv:1808.09363, 2018.
[14] Wei Chen, Alex Collins, Rachel Cummings, Te Ke, Zhenming Liu, David Rincon, Xiaorui Sun, Yajun Wang, Wei Wei, and Yifei Yuan. Influence
maximization in social networks when negative opinions may emerge and propagate. In Proceedings of the 2011 SIAM International Conference on
Data Mining, pages 379–390. SIAM, 2011.
[15] Wei Chen, Laks VS Lakshmanan, and Carlos Castillo. Information and influence propagation in social networks. Synthesis Lectures on Data
Management, 5(4):1–177, 2013.
[16] Wei Chen, Fu Li, Tian Lin, and Aviad Rubinstein. Combining traditional marketing and viral marketing with amphibious influence maximization. In
EC, 2015.
[17] Wei Chen, Chi Wang, and Yajun Wang. Scalable influence maximization for prevalent viral marketing in large-scale social networks. In Proceedings
of the 16th ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining, pages 1029–1038. ACM, 2010.
[18] Wei Chen, Yajun Wang, and Siyu Yang. Efficient influence maximization in social networks. In Proceedings of the 15th ACM SIGKDD international
conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining, pages 199–208. ACM, 2009.
[19] Wei Chen, Yifei Yuan, and Li Zhang. Scalable influence maximization in social networks under the linear threshold model. In Data Mining (ICDM),
2010 IEEE 10th International Conference on, pages 88–97. IEEE, 2010.
[20] Edith Cohen, Daniel Delling, Thomas Pajor, and Renato F Werneck. Sketch-based influence maximization and computation: Scaling up with
guarantees. In Proceedings of the 23rd ACM International Conference on Conference on Information and Knowledge Management, pages 629–638. ACM,
2014.
[21] Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, and Richard Steinberg. Combinatorial auctions. pages 1–33, 2006.
[22] Samik Datta, Anirban Majumder, and Nisheeth Shrivastava. Viral marketing for multiple products. In Data Mining (ICDM), 2010 IEEE 10th
International Conference on, pages 118–127. IEEE, 2010.
[23] Uriel Feige and Jan Vondrák. The submodular welfare problem with demand queries. Theory of Computing, 6(1):247–290, 2010.
[24] Xinran He, Guojie Song, Wei Chen, and Qingye Jiang. Influence blocking maximization in social networks under the competitive linear threshold
model. In Proceedings of the 2012 SIAM International Conference on Data Mining, pages 463–474. SIAM, 2012.
[25] Jack Hirshleifer. The private and social value of information and the reward to inventive activity. In Uncertainty in Economics, pages 541–556.
Elsevier, 1978.
[26] Keke Huang, Sibo Wang, Glenn Bevilacqua, Xiaokui Xiao, and Laks V. S. Lakshmanan. Revisiting the stop-and-stare algorithms for influence
maximization. Proc. VLDB Endow., 10(9):913–924, 2017.
[27] Albert Xin Jiang and Kevin Leyton-Brown. Bidding agents for online auctions with hidden bids. Machine Learning, 67(1-2):117–143, 2007.
[28] Kyomin Jung, Wooram Heo, and Wei Chen. Irie: Scalable and robust influence maximization in social networks. In Data Mining (ICDM), 2012 IEEE
12th International Conference on, pages 918–923. IEEE, 2012.
[29] Michael Kapralov, Ian Post, and Jan Vondrák. Online submodular welfare maximization: Greedy is optimal. In Proceedings of the Twenty-fourth
Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA ’13, pages 1216–1225, 2013.
35
[30] David Kempe, Jon Kleinberg, and Éva Tardos. Maximizing the spread of influence through a social network. In Proceedings of the ninth ACM SIGKDD
international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining, pages 137–146. ACM, 2003.
[31] Jinha Kim, Seung-Keol Kim, and Hwanjo Yu. Scalable and parallelizable processing of influence maximization for large-scale social networks? In
Data Engineering (ICDE), 2013 IEEE 29th International Conference on, pages 266–277. IEEE, 2013.
[32] Nitish Korula, Vahab Mirrokni, and Morteza Zadimoghaddam. Online submodular welfare maximization: Greedy beats 1/2 in random order. In
Proceedings of the forty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pages 889–898. ACM, 2015.
[33] Qiang Li, Wei Chen, Xiaoming Sun, and Jialin Zhang. Influence maximization with ϵ -almost submodular threshold functions. In NIPS, 2017.
[34] Yuchen Li, Ju Fan, Yanhao Wang, and Kian-Lee Tan. Influence maximization on social graphs: A survey. TKDE, 2018.
[35] Wei Lu, Francesco Bonchi, Amit Goyal, and Laks VS Lakshmanan. The bang for the buck: fair competitive viral marketing from the host perspective.
In Proceedings of the 19th ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining, pages 928–936. ACM, 2013.
[36] Wei Lu, Wei Chen, and Laks VS Lakshmanan. From competition to complementarity: comparative influence diffusion and maximization. Proceedings
of the VLDB Endowment, 9(2):60–71, 2015.
[37] Julian McAuley, Rahul Pandey, and Jure Leskovec. Inferring networks of substitutable and complementary products. In Proceedings of the 21th ACM
SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, pages 785–794. ACM, 2015.
[38] Paul Milgrom and John Roberts. Complementarities and fit strategy, structure, and organizational change in manufacturing. Journal of accounting
and economics, 1995.
[39] Seth A Myers and Jure Leskovec. Clash of the contagions: Cooperation and competition in information diffusion. In Data Mining (ICDM), 2012 IEEE
12th International Conference on, pages 539–548. IEEE, 2012.
[40] Roger B Myerson. Optimal auction design. Mathematics of operations research, 6(1):58–73, 1981.
[41] Ramasuri Narayanam and Amit A Nanavati. Viral marketing for product cross-sell through social networks. In Joint European Conference on
Machine Learning and Knowledge Discovery in Databases, pages 581–596. Springer, 2012.
[42] George L Nemhauser, Laurence A Wolsey, and Marshall L Fisher. An analysis of approximations for maximizing submodular set functions.
Mathematical Programming, 14(1):265–294, 1978.
[43] Hung T Nguyen, My T Thai, and Thang N Dinh. Stop-and-stare: Optimal sampling algorithms for viral marketing in billion-scale networks. In
Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Management of Data, pages 695–710. ACM, 2016.
[44] Walter Nicholson and Christopher Snyder. Microeconomic theory: Basic principles and extensions. Nelson Education, 2011.
[45] Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, Eva Tardos, and Vijay V Vazirani. Algorithmic game theory. Cambridge university press, 2007.
[46] Nishith Pathak, Arindam Banerjee, and Jaideep Srivastava. A generalized linear threshold model for multiple cascades. In Data Mining (ICDM), 2010
IEEE 10th International Conference on, pages 965–970. IEEE, 2010.
[47] Eric Rasmusen and Basil Blackwell. Games and information. Cambridge, MA, 15, 1994.
[48] Grant Schoenebeck and Biaoshuai Tao. Beyond worst-case (in)approximability of nonsubmodular influence maximization. In WINE, 2017.
[49] Tao Sun, Wei Chen, Zhenming Liu, Yajun Wang, Xiaorui Sun, Ming Zhang, and Chin-Yew Lin. Participation maximization based on social influence
in online discussion forums. In ICWSM, 2011.
[50] Jing Tang, Xueyan Tang, Xiaokui Xiao, and Junsong Yuan. Online processing algorithms for influence maximization. In SIGMOD, 2018.
[51] Youze Tang, Yanchen Shi, and Xiaokui Xiao. Influence maximization in near-linear time: A martingale approach. In Proceedings of the 2015 ACM
SIGMOD International Conference on Management of Data, pages 1539–1554. ACM, 2015.
[52] Youze Tang, Xiaokui Xiao, and Yanchen Shi. Influence maximization: Near-optimal time complexity meets practical efficiency. In Proceedings of the
2014 ACM SIGMOD international conference on Management of data, pages 75–86. ACM, 2014.
[53] Donald M Topkis. Supermodularity and Complementarity. Princeton University Press, 1998.
36
